Dynamic reasoning with qualified syllogisms  by Schwartz, Daniel G.
ELSEVIER Artificial Intelligence 93 ( 1997 ) 105 167 
Artificial 
Intelligence 
Dynamic reasoning with qualified syllogisms 
Daniel G. Schwartz’ 
Department of Computer Science, Florida State University, Tallahassee. FL 32306-4019, USA 
Received January 1996: revised January 1997 
Abstract 
A gualij%e~ syllogism is a classical Aristoteiean syllogism that has been “qualified” through 
the use of fuzzy quantifiers, likelihood modifiers, and usuality modifiers, e.g., “Most birds can 
Ry; Tweety is a bird; therefore, it is likely that Tweety can fly.” This paper introduces a formal 
logic Q of such syllogisms and shows how this may be employed in a system of nonmonotonj~ 
reasoning. In process are defined the notions of path logic and dynamic reasoning system (DRS) 
The former is an adaptation of the conventional formal system which explicitly portrays reasoning 
as an activity that takes place in time. The latter consists of a path logic together with a multiple- 
inhe~tance hierarchy. The hierarchy duplicates ome of the info~ation recorded in the path logic, 
but additionally provides an extralogical spec#icity relation. The system uses typed predicates to 
formally distinguish between properties and kinds of things. The effectiveness of the approach is 
demonstrated through analysis of several “puzzles” that have appeared previously in the literature, 
e.g., Tweety the Bird, Clyde the Elephant, and the Nixon Diamond. It is also outlined how the DRS 
framework accommodates other reasoning techniques-in particular, predicate circumscription, a
“localized” version of default logic, a variant of nonmonotonic logic, and reason maintenance. 
Furthermore it is seen that the same framework accomodates a new formulation of the notion of 
unless. A concluding section discusses the relevance of these systems to the well-known fiame 
problem. @ 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Modern logic was originated about a century ago, with its development aimed ini- 
tialIy at investigating the foundations of mathematics. In process many key concepts 
were fo~ulated, including in p~ticul~ that of a formal logical system together with 
the associated notions of proof, consistency, completeness, syntax versus semantics, and 
so on. Several schools of thought arose concerning what one should take as a solid 
grounding for the mathematical disciplines. Among these, Intuitionism brought forth 
constructive mathematics (see [ 76]), which led to formulations of the notion of com- 
putability. This in turn played a key role in the development of computer science, and it 
revived anew the centuries old vision of a “thinking machine” (as in [ 1781). When the 
first computers were being invented, it was noted that these could be programmed not 
only for mathematical computations, but also logical reasoning. The subsequent quest 
to make computers perform ever more sophisticated types of mental activities then gave 
birth to the subdiscipline known as AI. 
Shortly after computers were first being programmed to perform logical deductions, 
however, it was found that the notion of formal system which had served so well for 
exploring the foundations of mathematics would not be adequate for encoding all the 
salient aspects of natural human reasoning. Of critical importance was the discovery that 
everyday reasoning is oftentimes nonmonotonj~ in that the acquisition of new information 
may lead one to go back and retract old conclusions. This style of reasoning arises 
under conditions of incomplete information. If one has perfect knowledge regarding 
the situation at hand, then one’s inferences can in principle be drawn with absolute 
certainty; but when the available information is less than complete, then one can draw 
conclusions only tentatively, keeping in mind that these may become invalid should 
additional information be obtained. Since the conventional type of formal system is 
monotonic in that the addition of new information (axioms) serves generally to expand 
the set of derivable conclusions (theorems), it does not allow for this newer kind of 
reasoning activity to be expressed. 
Hence in the interests of creating machines with more human-like “intelligence”, there 
ensued a concerted effort to identify and formalize various aspects of this nonmonotonic 
behavior. An early work of this genre is the 1969 paper by McCarthy and Hayes [ 1041, 
now well-known for identifying the frame problem. That work contained the seeds of 
several later developments. In particular, it introduced the situation calculus, a new kind 
of formalism embodying a history-namely, a sequence of propositions expressed in a 
language admitting modal operators consistent, ~zormally, and probably-together with 
a set of rules specifying how a history may be grown by adding new propositions. For 
example, 
normally(q5), consistent( q5) t- probably( (p) 
says that if 4 is normally true, and 4 is consistent with what is known so far (i.e., with 
respect to the existing history), then one may add to the history the assertion that 4 is 
probably true. 
D.G. Schwartz/Artificial Intelligence 93 (1997) 103-167 105 
A decade later, four separate approaches to nonmonotonicity appeared almost simul- 
taneously. First was Doyle’s truth maintenance system [ 251. This provided a mechanism 
for keeping track of logical dependencies in such a way that derivation steps can be 
retraced, and formerly held conclusions can be retracted. The resulting formalism bears 
a resemblance to the earlier notion of history, but also offers the novel feature that 
conclusions are held, not only because certain earlier propositions are held (are “in”), 
but also because certain other propositions are not held (are “out”). Such formalisms 
have more recently been dubbed reason maintenance systems reflecting the fact that it 
is the reasons for conclusions that are at issue, rather than their objective truth (e.g., 
see [ 1631). 
Second was McCarthy’s method of circumscription [ 1001. This provided a “rule of 
conjecture” by virtue of which one assumes that the only individuals x that have a 
certain property P are those that are explicitly required (i.e., as a consequence of the 
axioms) to have P. In effect, one “circumscribes” the collection of individuals that must 
have P by tentatively asserting that this is all there are. The kind of formalism one 
considers in circumscriptive reasoning thus represents a snapshot of the current state of 
affairs-it contains all conclusions that one might reasonably draw, given the present 
body of information. Nonmonotonicity enters when further individuals subsequently are 
found that also have property P. These are then added to the formalism, and conclusions 
(conjectures) are redrawn, yielding a potentially smaller set than before. 
Third was Reiter’s default logic [ 1501. This introduced derivation schemata such as 
Bird(x) : MCanFly( x) 
CanFly( x) 
where M is a modal operator taken to express “is consistent”. The rule is interpreted 
as saying that, if x is a bird, and it is consistent to assume that x can fly, then one may 
infer (by default) that x can fly. As with circumscription, the resulting formalism is a 
snapshot of the current knowledge and conjectures. Given that Tweety is a bird, and in 
the absence of any countervailing information, one concludes that Tweety can fly. If at a 
later time, however, it is learned that Tweety is a penguin, say, then the formalism would 
be expanded by adjoining this fact about Tweety as a new axiom. Then conclusions are 
redrawn based on this new, enlarged axiom set, and if there happens to be an axiom or 
theorem asserting that penguins cannot fly, CanFly( Tweety) now becomes inconsistent, 
and the earlier inference made by default is blocked. 
Last is the nonmonotonic logic of McDermott and Doyle [ 1071. This is similar in 
spirit with Reiter’s default logic, in that it too employs a modal operator M expressing 
“is consistent”; but the style of formalism is much different. Here JW is made an explicit 
element of the language, so that the sense of the foregoing default rule is here expressed 
by the formula 
Bird(x) A M[CanFly(x)] + CanFly 
The language for this system is provided with a Kripke-style “possible worlds” seman- 
tics, with M being interpreted as roughly equivalent with the classical modality “is 
possible”. The intent is that, if the there is a possible world in which Tweety is a bird 
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that can fly, then both conditions of the above inference hold, and one can apply classical 
Modus Ponens to infer that Tweety can fly. But if there are further propositions asserted, 
e.g., to the effect that Tweety is a penguin and penguins cannot fly, then there will be 
no possible world in which Tweety can fly. In this case the condition M [CanFly( 
will fail to hold, and the inference cannot be employed. Again the formalism represents 
a snapshot of current knowledge, together with whatever conclusions may be inferred 
from that knowledge; and as new information is added, and conclusions are redrawn, a 
possibly smaller set of conclusions will result. 
A later development was McCarthy’sformula circumscription [ 1011, a generalization 
of the earlier version which, to avoid confusion was here renamed predicate circumscrip- 
tion. McCarthy attributed the challenge to create logical formalisms adequate to “express 
the facts and non-monotonic reasoning concerning the ability of birds to fly” to Marvin 
Minsky, and he presented numerous examples illustrating how formula circumscription 
may be applied to this task. 
While McCarthy and Hayes [ 1041 had suggested the use of a modality expressing 
“probably”, they also argued that it would be inappropriate to assign numerical prob- 
abilities to individual propositions. First, “it is not clear how to attach probabilities to 
statements containing quantifiers in a way that corresponds to the amount of conviction 
people have”. Second, “the information necessary to assign numerical probabilities is 
not ordinarily available”. To this one might also add the observation that humans them- 
selves almost never reason in terms of numerical probabilities. Hence in the interests of 
developing more human-like reasoning systems, numerical probabilities need not (and 
perhaps should not) be explicitly portrayed. 
This of course does not conflict with the earlier suggestion to include probability as 
a modality. In effect the proposal there was to employ a “qualitative” probability, rather 
than a numerical one. That suggestion notwithstanding, however, all four approaches 
described above avoid this issue altogether. Instead they in one way or another adopt 
the more straightforward reasoning strategy wherein, in the absence of any counter- 
vailing information, one simply assumes that a certain inference can be applied, while 
at the same time holding in reserve the option to revise this assumption should such 
information later be obtained. This approach is clearly a natural one, inasmuch as it is 
commonly employed in normal everyday reasoning. But by the same token, the proba- 
bilistic approach originally proposed is also quite natural. Indeed it is just as common 
as the nonprobabilistic variety. 
Hence perhaps for this reason alone, the prospect of somehow applying probability 
theory to nonmonotonic reasoning has resisted being put to rest. Rich [ 1521 expressed 
the view that default reasoning could be treated as a form of “likelihood reasoning”, 
but did not develop it. Similar thoughts were expressed by Ginsberg [60], and then 
carried forward through [ 621 and the doctoral dissertation by Darwiche [ 211 (see 
also [ 221). The latter presents a “symbolic generalization” of probability theory, based 
on the abstract notion of a “degree of support”. This provides a qualitative theory 
of probability in the sense that it preserves the key elements of Bayesian probability 
theory, while removing the strict dependence on numerical evaluations. The same variety 
of qualitativeness is shared with the formulations of likelihood due to Nilsson [ 1241, 
Halpern and Rabin [ 671, and Halpern and McAllester [ 661. These systems are based on 
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a Kripke-style possible-worlds semantics, however, taking likelihood as a reinterpretation 
of the underlying reachability relation, and hence yield a much different formalism than 
those based on probability theory. 
In parallel with these studies was Pearl’s development of the “e-semantics” [ 1321 and 
the System Z [ 1331, which led to the award-winning doctoral dissertation by Geffner 
[ 591. This line of thought exploits Adams’ [ 1,2,4] presentation of the logical condi- 
tional as a conditional probability, and it uses Adams’ notion of “high probability” as 
an interpretation of the (nonmonotonic) modifiers typically and normally. To wit, an as- 
sertion such as “Typically birds can fly” is represented by there being a high probability 
that an arbitrarily chosen bird will be able to fly. The idea of interpreting the logical con- 
ditional in this way dates back to Ramsey [ 1491 and has been taken up in philosophical 
circles by Lewis [ 931 and Stalnaker [ 1671. Lewis’s “triviality result”, establishing cer- 
tain limitations of this approach, has undergone subsequent investigation [ 27,108,l lo], 
and it plays a crucial role in the systems being presented here (Section 2.4). A related 
line of development deserving of mention is the study of “conditional objects” due to 
Dubois and Prade [ 32,331 based on their developments in possibility theory [ 291. 
Adams [ 31 had further argued that “high probability” could be interpreted as almost 
all. Analogously with the above, an assertion to the effect that “Almost all A’s are B’s” 
may be represented by there being a high probability that an arbitrarily chosen A will 
be a B. This interpretation was not employed, however, in the Pearl-Geffner approach 
to nonmonotonicity. 
A continuation of the Adams-Pearl line of thought has emerged in the works of 
Bacchus [ 9, IO], Halpern [ 651, and Bacchus, Grove, Halpern, and Koller [ 11,121. 
These papers develop formalisms that allow for expressions such as 
Pr[CanFly(x) 1 Bird(x)] E 1 
taken as expressing “Almost all birds can fly”, which in turn is taken as representing 
“Typically birds can fly”, and expressions such as 
Pr[Hep(x) / Jaun(x)] = 0.8 
taken as expressing “approximately 80% of patients with jaundice have hepatitis”. A 
theory of “statistical syllogisms”, featuring a similar probabilistic representation of the 
modifier most, has been proposed by Pollock [ 1441. Another related line of development 
are the foundational studies in probability and statistics due to Kyburg [ 88-901. 
The main early papers on nonmonotonic reasoning have been reprinted in the collec- 
tion [ 611. An in-depth comparison of most of the foregoing formalisms, together with 
several others not considered here, may be found in [ 1641. This gives a summary of 
virtually all approaches to reasoning with incomplete information that were in print as 
of that date. 
Reiter [ 1501 had noted the possible relevance of the notion of “most” for nonmono- 
tonic reasoning, and he regarded this concept as implicit in the use of default logic. 
The abovementioned works by Pearl, Halpern, Bacchus, and others take this another 
step by developing formalisms containing propositions which can be interpreted as more 
explicitly encoding the idea of “most”. But none of these make the term fully explicit 
in the sense of directly introducing it into the syntax of the languages. 
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A body of work oriented toward the latter task has been advanced by L.A. Zadeh, 
the founder of the theory of fuzzy sets. The paper [ 1991 presented a semantics for 
fuzzy quan@rs--modifiers such as most, many, few, almost all, etc.-and introduced 
the idea of reasoning with syllogistic arguments along the lines of “Most men are vain; 
Socrates is a man; therefore, it is ~~~~~~ that Socrates is vain”, where vanity is given 
as a fuzzy predicate. In this and numerous succeeding publications (see Section 2.1) 
Zadeh has developed well-defined semantics also for fuuy probabilities (e.g., likely, 
very likely, uncertain, unlikely, etc.) and fuzzy usuality modi$ers (e.g., usually, often, 
seldom, etc.). In addition, he has argued at numerous conferences over the years that 
these modifiers offer an appropriate and intuitively correct approach to nonmonotonic 
reasoning. 
The matter of exactly how these various modifiers are interrelated, however, and 
therefore of a concise semantics for such syllogisms, was not fully explored. Thus 
while a new methodology for nonmonotonic reasoning was suggested, it had not been 
completely developed. The present work grew initially out of an effort to realize this 
goal. 
1.2. Overview 
The first task, undertaken in Section 2, is to define the system Q for reasoning with 
quali$ed syllogisms. In effect, these are classical Aristotelean syllogisms that have been 
“qualified” through the use of fuzzy quantification, usuality, and likelihood. (The term 
“fuzzy likelihood” is here preferred over “fuzzy probability”, taking the latter to mean 
a probability which is evaluated as a fuzzy number.) In contrast with the syllogisms 
originally considered by Zadeh, we here deal only with the case of fuzzy modifiers in 
application to crisp (nonfuzzy) predicates. Some examples are 
Most birds can fly. 
Tweety is a bird. 
It is likely that Tweety can fly. 
Usually, if something is a bird, it can fly. 
Tweety is a bird. 
It is likely that Tweety can lly. 
Very few cats have no tails. 
Felix is a cat. 
It is very unlikely that Felix has no tail. 
From a common-sense perspective, such arguments are certainly intuitively correct. Sys- 
tem Q features a completely specified language, suitable for expressing such syllogisms, 
together with a semantics which validates them. The semantics is based on a probabilis- 
tic interpretation of the modifiers, and it adopts the earlier idea of interpreting logical 
conditionals as conditional probabilities. The system is unorthodox in that it employs 
two distinct semantic levels, the lower level being multivalent (probabilistic) and the 
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upper being bivalent (classical). Briefly, a formula of the form LikelyP is assigned the 
value true just in case the probability value of P falls within a certain subinterval of 
[ 0, 1 ] . Thus one obtains a qualitative version of probabilistic reasoning in the sense 
that the reasoner here deals directly only with the linguistic modifiers-no reference to 
numerical probabilities appears in the formal syntax. 
Section 3 shows how a version of the classical modalities, possibility and necessig, 
can be defined in terms of fuzzy quantifiers. This builds on an idea put forth by Rescher 
[ 1511. A proposition may be deemed necessary if its probability of being true is 1, and 
possible if this probability is greater than 0. It turns out that not all the axioms for the 
well-known modal logics K, S4, and S5 (see [ 801) can be expressed in the language 
of Q as presently construed, but those that can be are validated by the semantics for Q. 
Section 4 introduces the notion of a path logic. In a system that offers fuzzy likelihood 
modifiers, there naturally arises the desire to have rules for modifier combination. For 
example, one might want such rules as 
LikelyP 
UnlikelyP 
UncertainP 
LikelyP 
CertainlyP 
CertainlyP 
The former allows one to say that, if by some line of reasoning (or collection of 
evidence) one were to conclude LikelyP, and by another line (evidence) one were to 
conclude UnlikelyP, then one may combine these to conclude UncertainP. The latter 
rule asserts, in effect, that certainly dominates likely. 
Such rules however cannot be expressed within the system Q. This is because that 
system’s definition employs the conventional notions of formal system and semantics, 
wherein under any particular truth (or probability) valuation each formula must have 
a unique such value. Otherwise the valuation function would not be well-defined. In 
order that the first of the above rules be meaningful, however, each of the three different 
occurrences of P would need to have a different probability value (the subintervals 
associated with the three different likelihood modifiers should be nonoverlapping), and 
in the second rule, the two occurrences of P in the premises should have different 
probabilities, while the occurrence in the conclusion should have the same probability 
as the one in the second premise. 
Upon reflection it becomes evident that, whenever one applies a rule of this kind, it 
is implicit that his reasoning is an activity which is taking place in time. To wit, the 
first example says that, if at a certain time t one has LikelyP, and at another time t’ one 
has UncertainP, then at a later time t” one may conclude UncertainP. Accordingly, in 
order to express such rules it is necessary to make this temporal aspect explicit in such 
a way as to distinguish between the different occurrences of P. 
The notion of a path logic provides this capability. In effect this is a straightforward 
adaptation of the conventional notion of formal logical system, obtained by lending 
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special semantic status to derivation paths. Formulas appearing in such a path can now 
be indexed by their location in the path, with each successive index representing the next 
time step. Then if the same formula occurs more than once, the different occurrences 
will be distinguished by having different indices. Probability valuations can then be 
defined as acting on indexed formulas in such a way that the different occurrences of 
P may have different values. The formula’s index will be included, along with other 
extralogical items, in a label. 
In addition to having a formula be appended to the path by deriving it from earlier 
formulas, a formula may be received from an external source. This choice of terminology 
reflects the view that a path logic may be regarded as a part of the “mind” of a digital 
(hardware or software) agent. As examples, formulas so received may represent input 
from a human user, data collected from a sensor, or messages received from another 
similar agent. Items added to the path might be new beliefs, facts (i.e., beliefs held 
with absolute certainty), or instructions to perform an action (e.g., turn right, log into 
website X, or send a message to agent Y). A belief may be retracted by turning its 
status indicator (also recorded in the formula’s label) from “on” to “off”. A formula 
with status set to “off” is no longer available for use in further inferences. This new 
formalism also allows that the language itself may grow, for example, by introducing new 
individual names or predicate symbols, and as well it admits addition of new inference 
rules. Collectively, these various features make a path logic amount to a propositional 
knowledge base which evolves over time. Nonmonotonicity occurs whenever a belief 
is retracted. A way in which such retractions may be negotiated through a modified 
version of Doyle’s truth (or reason) maintenance system will be outlined in Section 5 
and then taken up in greater detail in Section 7. 
Shoham [ 157,158] has also explored the idea of making time an explicit feature of 
the formalism. But those works deal with formalizing one’s reasoning about change, 
i.c., with modeling the way an agent might reason about temporal events in the ex- 
ternal world, whereas the present concern is with modeling changes in the reasoner’s 
own mental state. As such, the present work is more in spirit with, and in fact em- 
bodies some of the same ideas as, the “agent-oriented” system outlined by Shoham 
in [ 1591. A more recent approach to reasoning about change, and furthermore one 
incorporating probability theory, has been proposed by Hanks and McDermott [ 681. 
There, as with Shoham’s earlier works, the main concern is with robot motion plan- 
ning. 
The present work bears several elements in common with those of Perlis and his 
students [ 34,36-38, 109, 1381. These various writings develop a theory of “active logics” 
(formerly “step logics”) which also portrays reasoning as an activity which is “situated” 
in time. Similarly as with path logics, reasoning is viewed as occurring in discrete time 
steps, and the present notion of a “path” turns out to be essentially identical with their 
notion of a sequence of formulas arranged along a “time line”. Path logics employ 
a somewhat different style of formalism, however, and in the following are oriented 
toward a different set of problems. The present concern is with modeling multiple- 
inheritance reasoning about static domains (see the following), while there the concern 
is with reasoning about domains that are dynamically changing. Recent works have dealt 
with planning [ 35, 125- 1271 and with inter-agent communication [ 63,64,140, 1471. 
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Another recent work suggesting that reasoning might be portrayed as time-situated is 
Sandewall’s [ 1551. 
Both path logic and active logic embody a view of reasoning that is expressed also by 
the methods of “belief revision” due to Gardenfors [ 57,581, of “knowledge revision” 
due to Wrobel [ 1891, and of “belief change” due to Friedman and Halpern [ 53-551. 
A possibilistic treatment of some of these same issues has been studied by Dubois and 
Prade [ 3 11. In these frameworks the totality of the reasoning agent’s knowledge and 
beliefs is represented as a collection of propositions which evolves over a series of 
discrete time steps, with each step typically involving either an addition or a retraction 
of propositions in the knowledge base. As such, this constitutes a new approach to 
the problem of “logical omniscience” first discussed by Hintikka [77] and then taken 
up more recently by Fagin and Halpern [44] and Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 
[ 45,461. This problem is that when one uses a conventional formal logical system to 
represent an agent’s knowledge, it is inherent in the formalism that if the reasoner knows 
certain facts about the world, then he also knows all possible logical consequences of 
those facts. Thus one is led to an unrealistic model of both human and digital reasoning. 
This difficulty is neatly avoided by the newer formalisms which represent knowledge as 
evolving in time. At each time step, the knowledge base contains only what the reasoner 
has either assumed or deduced as of that step, and nothing further. 
Having thus explicated via path logic the temporal aspects of everyday reasoning, 
the present work turns next to the issue of reasoning with defaults. A particularly 
useful alternative to Reiter’s style of default reasoning has arisen through the use of 
inheritance hierarchies. Here one employs a taxonomy for keeping track of the relation 
between different kinds of things-e.g., a penguin is a kind of bird, a bird is a kind 
of animal, etc. With each such kind there is an associated list of properties, and it 
is agreed that entities at lower levels inherit the properties of their higher-level kinds 
b_~ default, unless such inheritance is blocked at the lower levels by countervailing 
properties. For example, a penguin might inherit all the properties of birds except that 
of being able to fly, since this is blocked by the fact that penguins have the property 
of being unable to fly. The underlying principle is that lower-level classifications are 
more specific than higher-level ones, and the more specific information takes priority. 
Early thoughts along these lines appeared in Fahlman’s system NETL [47] (see also 
[ 1731). A closely related notion is that of a “frame” developed initially by Minsky 
[ 1121 and later discussed by Hayes [ 711. This amounts to a data structure representing 
a particular kind of things, comprised of a field containing the name of the kind, 
together with a collection of “slots” representing the properties of things of that kind. 
These various ideas have subsequently gone through several stages of development 
[ 39,40,43,119, 175,176], with [ 1191 being more fully developed as the basis for the 
commercial software package KEE [48]. These methods of knowledge representation 
have been found to harbor some rather unpleasant anomalies, however (see for example 
[ 17, I8,8 1,177] ), and efforts to resolve these problems have led to numerous further 
investigations (e.g., [ 16,78,79,83, 154, 156,162,168] ). 
It turns out that most of these difficulties stem from the need for dealing with multiple 
inheritance, i.e., allowing that an individual may be of more than one kind. Curiously, 
none of the works since those of Fahlman, Minsky, and Hayes have bothered to make 
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the earlier distinction between properties and kinds. Instead, even though this distinction 
is intuitively implicit, the fo~alisms themselves treat all collections essentially as just 
kinds of things. This leads to a somewhat simpler style of formalism, but as will 
become evident here, this apparent simplification lies at the root of virtually all of the 
more troublesome anomalies. 
The subject of multiple inheritance is taken up by the present work in Section 5. 
This introduces a new kind of fo~alism referred to as a dynamic reusun~ng s~~~e~~ 
(DRS). Briefly, a DRS is a temporally evolving structure composed of a path logic and 
a semantic network which interact with one another in various ways. The subject of 
semantic networks has an extensive history, by some accounts dating back to the mid- 
1800s. For a recent survey see the edited collection by Lehmann [91]. In the present 
treatment, semantic networks will be inheritance hierarchies of the variety described 
above, including the use of typed nodes to distinguish properties from kinds, and allowing 
for multiple inheritance. The earlier notion of language for Q is here expanded to employ 
typed predicate symbols, so as to similarly distinguish formally between predicates 
representing properties versus kinds. Then it is agreed that, whenever formulas having 
certain specified forms are added to the path, an appropriate co~esponding entry is 
made in the inheritance hierarchy. For example, if one were to add to the path a formula 
asserting that penguins are birds, then an entry to this effect would be made in the 
inheritance hierarchy, connecting a kind node representing “Penguin” to a kind node 
representing “Bird”; and if a formula stating that most birds can fly were to be added to 
the path, a link would be entered connecting the kind node for “Bird” to a property node 
representing “CanFly”, and the link would be qualified with the label most. Restrictions 
are made to ensure that the hierarchy always remains “well-behaved”, e.g., connections 
between kind nodes are always crisp (involve only non-fuzzy qualifiers) and loops and 
redundant paths are disallowed. 
As such the inheritance hierarchy dupiicates information already expressed by for- 
mulas in the path, but it does so in such a way as to provide a basis for defining the 
abovementioned specificity relation. Each kind node is assigned an address in such a 
way that nodes with higher addresses are lower in the hierarchy, and hence are more 
specific. The address is taken as a speciJcity rank, and the rank is recorded in the corre- 
sponding formula’s label. Then inference rules can be devised for the path logic which 
reference the specificity ranks in such a way as to correctly perform the desired style 
of default reasoning. The above requirement for maintaining well-behavedness ensures 
that the specificity ranks will be well-defined. 
The typing of predicates does not come without cost, however. This is because there 
is oftentimes a certain arbitrariness in deciding whether a given class of objects should 
be taken as representing a property versus a kind. For example, in the well-known 
Nixon Diamond problem it is a matter of choice how one thus regards the predicates 
“Quaker”, “Republican”, and “Pacifist” (see the discussion in Section 5). Nonetheless 
it turns out that by judicious use of these added extralogical distinctions, most of the 
anomalies that have vexed prior efforts can be avoided. This is demonstrated through 
detailed analysis of several “puzzles” that have arisen in the literature and which to a 
certain extent serve as test cases for multiple-inheri~nce reasoners. These include the 
time-worn examples of Tweety and Opus, Clyde the Elephant, and the Nixon Diamond, 
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together with several others that have appeared more recently. The last example in the 
series illustrates a situation wherein the same predicate is taken as representing both a 
property and a kind. 
Section 6 considers the common-sense notion of unless as it is found in natural 
language propositions of the form “if P then Q unless R”. In effect this deals with 
logical inferences that have exceptions. This is closely tied up with default reasoning, 
and it appears in various guises in several of the works cited above. The type of 
reasoning represented by such propositions is already implicit in the DRS described in 
Section 5, inasmuch as exceptions may be deduced via the specificity relation in the 
multiple-inheritance hierarchy. For many implementations, however, it may be desired to 
make such reasoning more explicit. This can be done as follows. Agree that the label for 
a formula such as “Most Birds can fly” may contain an optional exception list having 
two different kinds of entries: exceptional individuals (e.g., Opus) and exceptional 
properties (e.g., being a penguin). Entries are made in the exception list only as they 
are deduced and entered into the path. This leads to a procedural semantics for the 
kind of syllogisms discussed above: apply an inference to an individual only if it is not 
known to be exceptional. One in this manner obtains a new and intuitively satisfying 
rendition of the normal use of the word “unless”. 
Section 7 reconsiders the four original approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning and 
shows how each, either in full or in some restricted sense, can be reformulated within 
the path-logic/DRS framework. The significance of this is that it shows how the for- 
malisms studied here can be used to make explicit the temporal aspects of nonmonotonic 
reasoning that are merely implicit in the earlier studies. For predicate circumscription, 
one needs only that the path logic’s language admit predicate variables. Then the cir- 
cumscriptive “rule of conjecture” can be expressed as just another rule of inference. 
For default logic, there are the well-known difficulties that (i) in first-order systems it 
is undecidable whether a given formula is consistent with some given set of formulas, 
and (ii) even in simpler systems, where relative consistency is decidable, it typically 
is computationally intractable. Hence even though default logic is intuitively appealing, 
it forbids any direct implementation in all but the very simplest of cases. By appeal to 
the temporal features of path logics, however, one can devise a variant of default logic 
that avoids these difficulties. First define a notion of local or n-ply consistency, meaning 
free from contradiction for at least the next n reasoning steps. Then agree to apply 
defaults only under condition of consistency out to some reasonable n. Such a reasoning 
strategy would appropriately be used in conjunction with a reason maintenance system, 
SO as to adequately deal with inconsistencies that may later be discovered beyond the 
nth future step. Reason maintenance can be implemented in the path logic formalism by 
allowing a formula’s label to include information about how the formula was derived. 
This information can then be referenced in backtracking, looking for the sources of 
inconsistencies. A semblance of nonmonotonic logic can be crafted via the version of 
classical modalities defined in Section 3. 
Section 8 takes up the frame problem, together with some of its relatives, from the 
perspective of a DRS. Here an important distinction is made between problems associated 
with reasoning about static (unchanging) domains versus dynamic (changing) ones. It 
is pointed out that the frame problem arises only in the context of the latter. Thus 
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inasmuch as multiple-inheritance reasoning is always about static domains, the frame 
problem does not pertain. It is here outIined, however, how the notion of a path logic may 
be extended to the more complicated realm of dynamic domains and in this context how 
the frame problem and its relatives once again raise their troublesome heads, Section 9 
outlines a few possible future developments. 
This paper is the culmination of about 7 years of thinking on these various topics. 
The ideas have evolved through a rather lengthy series of conference articles discussing 
bits and pieces of the overall system, and in process they have undergone numerous 
modifications and expansions. This has included several false starts, a few blind alleys, 
and one or two outright blunders. A major modification for the system Q, appearing here 
for the first time, is a shift from a probabilistic semantics based on relative cardinalities to 
one based on Bayesian subjectivist probability theory (as in f 23,132] ). This change was 
made in order to avoid certain limitations and mathematical complexities with the former 
approach. The earlier semantics is here reintroduced as an alternative, however, that can 
he useful for certain types of applications. There has also been some simplification of 
the syntax for Q, and several new topics have been added to the elaboration of the DRS. 
In particular, the material in Sections 6, 7, and 8 appear here for the first time. As such 
this paper is the first presentation of all these ideas in a single unified reasoning system. 
It is intended to supersede all prior works. 
2. A logic of qualified syllogisms 
2.1. Sources and related works 
In this paper, thefuzzy quantifiers will include the crisp modifiers all and 110, as well as 
the imprecise ones mentioned earlier. Similarly, the usual@ modijers will include always 
and never, and the ~~ke~~~~ood rn d~~ers will include ce~a~n~y and certainly not. The 
fuzzy quantiliers discussed by Zadeh additionally included modifiers like “several” and 
“around 50”, but these will not be considered here. In the literature, usuality modifiers are 
sometimes referred to as “frequency adjectives”, and likelihood modifiers as “linguistic 
probabilities”. 
Following the initial discussion of fuzzy quantification in [ 1991, the subject was 
developed at length by Zadeh and Bellman [ 2061 and Zadeh [ 201,202,204]. A primary 
aim of those works was to provide a well-defined semantics for propositions such as 
‘“Most students are young”, where young is given as a fuzzy subset of a collection 
of ages. Briefly, most is interpreted as a fuzzy subset S of the interval [0, 11; there 
is computed a real number referred to as the re~atj~e sigma count of the number of 
students which are young; and the given proposition is interpreted as being equivalent 
with the assertion “Zcount(young/student) is S’. The sigma count of a fuzzy set, e.g., 
Zcount(young), is a generalization of the notion of cardinality for crisp (non-fuzzy) 
sets, so that the relative sigma count is the corresponding generalization of the relative 
cardinalities of crisp sets; it is the sigma count of the number of students which are 
yo~zg divided by the total number of students. The resulting semantics based on sigma 
counts winds up being a natural and straightforward generalization to fuzzy sets of the 
D.G. Schwartz/Artificial Intelligence 93 (1997) 103-167 11s 
simple probability measure that is based on relative cardinalities of crisp sets. Indeed, 
if one restricts the formula for the relative sigma count to only crisp sets, then one gets 
back the standard probability measure. 
Several of these same modifiers had been studied earlier by Mostowski [ 1 IS] under 
the heading of “generalized quantifiers”, but employing a quite different semantics: each 
quantifier is there represented as a class of subsets of the underlying universe. Most 
subsequent work in this area has focused on cardinality quantifiers-e.g., uncountably 
many, at least IO, and exactly 3 (see the collection by Barwise and Feferman [ 14])- 
with interest in modifiers like few, most and many only reemerging two decades later. 
Peterson [ 1411 and Stump [ 1691 undertook philosophical analyses of these terms, and 
Barwise and Cooper [ 131 continued the broader development of Mostowski’s semantics 
for generalized quantifiers. The latter in turn sparked a new flurry of activity, leading 
to van Benthem’s [ 180-1821 and van Eijck’s [ 1851, as well as the edited collections 
by van Benthem and ter Meulen [ 1841 and Gardenfors [56]. A brief comparison of 
Mostowski’s and Zadeh’s semantics may be found in Thiele’s [ 1711. Another related 
work is Kiesler’s theory of “probability quantifiers” [ 821. This allows for propositions 
of the form “the probability that P is true about individual a, is at least Y”, by taking r 
as the probability measure of the set of individuals about which P is true. 
The fuzzy sets notion of usuality was introduced by Zadeh in [204] and then contin- 
ued with [ 2051. Those papers additionally mention, but do not elaborate, an apparent 
connection between usuality and quantification. Nonetheless Zadeh’s later papers clearly 
suggest that the two concepts might be modeled by essentially the same semantics. 
Usuality logic was termed “dispositional logic” by Zadeh, in reference to the fact that 
when one knows that a certain phenomenon “usually” occurs, then one is “disposed” to 
expect that it will continue to occur in the same way in the future. A way to employ 
usuality in nonmonotonic reasoning has been explored by Whalen and Schott [ 1881. 
Fuzzy likelihood was first touched upon by Zadeh in [ 1991, discussed at length in 
[ 2001, and then taken up again in [ 2031. In contrast with quantification and usuality, this 
represents likelihood modifiers as fuzzy subsets of the unit interval [ 0, l] . Accordingly, 
the technical differences between these formulations of quantification versus likelihood 
make them unsuitable for direct implementation as a semantics for qualified syllogisms. 
An early attempt at formulating such syllogisms via probability theory is [ 1131. A 
selection of Zadeh’s key papers are reprinted in [ 1981. 
An alternative approach to fuzzy quantification has been explored by Yager [ 190- 
1971. This semantics begins with the observation that the classical “for all”, as in “All 
students are young”, is logically equivalent with the conjunction “student-l is young 
AND student-2 is young AND etc.,” where “student-l ,” “student-2,” etc. are all the 
students in the underlying domain of discourse. Similarly the classical “there exists”, 
as in “There exists a student that is young”, is logically equivalent with the disjunction 
“student-l is young OR student-2 is young OR etc.” Taking the fuzzy quantifiers like 
most and few as being intermediary between for all and there exists, Yager represents 
these as operators which are weakenings of the logical AND and/or strengthenings 
of the logical OR. These operators, known as “ordered weighted averages”, or OWA 
operators, are shown to have many of the algebraic properties one would desire of fuzzy 
quantifiers. 
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Further investigations of the probabilistic interpretation of fuzzy quantifiers have been 
undertaken by Dubois and Prade [Z&30], Amarger, Epenoy, and Grihon [5], and 
Amarger, Dubois, and Prade 16-81. These works mostly consider just the case of 
fuzzy quantifiers applied to propositions involving only crisp predicates, and where the 
quantifiers are given as subintervals of [O, I]. The authors limit themselves to this 
simpIer case for the purpose of studying the problem of inference chaining, but clearly 
reserve the option of gener~izing to the case of fuzzy predicates and fuzzy qu~ti~ers 
in the original sense of Zadeh. Some preliminary efforts in the latter direction have 
appeared in [30], however. The primary aim of these studies was to answer: For 
arbitrary quantifiers Qt, !&, given that &t A’s are B’s, and that Q2 B’s are C’s, what 
can be said about how many A’s might be C’s? It has been shown that, when Qt and Q2 
are interpreted as subintervals of probabilities, an algorithm can be applied to compute 
upper and lower bounds for the probability that an A will be a C. It turns out that 
the interval determined by these upper and lower bounds is normally larger, and hence 
less precise, than the ones started with. This correlates with the normal intuition that 
imprecision accumulates as the reasoning chains increase in length. Similar ideas have 
been put forth by Narazaki and Turksen [ 120,121]. 
Experimental investigations of the natural human use of usuality and likelihood modi- 
fiers have been reported in the Psychology literature. Mosteller and Youtz [ 1171 summa- 
rize the results of 20 such studies, covering 52 different modifiers. Kuipers, Moskowitz, 
and Kassirer [87] studied the use of such modifiers in decision making under uncer- 
tainty. A psychological argument for regarding quantifiers as “fuzzy” notions has been 
put forth by Newstead [ 1231. 
Zimmer [ 207-2101 undertook a series of experiments investigating the extent to 
which the natural human use of fuzzy quantifiers, usuality modifiers, and likelihood 
modifiers conforms to the standard fuzzy-sets interpretations. In [ 20,186,187,2 11,2 121 
various combinations of Erev, Budescu, Forsyth, Rapaport, Wallsten, and Zwick report 
experiments studying the use of linguistic probabilities and the extent to which their 
actual meanings and rules of logical combination (in conjunctions and disjunctions) 
compare with various fuzzy-sets models. These collective works emphasize the potential 
usefulness of finding ways to replicate this type of reasoning on a computer. 
2.2. M~tivuti~~ 
The first objective is to devise a logic which successfully captures the style of rea- 
soning exemplified by the three syllogisms given in Section 1.2. The principal insights 
that led to the present rendition are as follows. First, it was noted that there is a natural 
connection between fuzzy quantification and fuzzy likelihood. To illustrate, the statement 
Most birds can fly. 
may be regarded as equivalent with 
If x is a bird, then it is likely that x can fly. 
The implicit connection is provided by the notion of a statistical sampling. In each case 
one is asserting 
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Given a bird randomly selected from the population of all birds, 
there is a high F~u~u~i~i~ that it will be able to fly. 
Suppose we express this equivalence as 
(Most x)(Bird(x) -+ CanFly( +-+ (Bird(x) + LikelyCanFly( x) ) 
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Then the first of the two syllogisms involving Tweety can be reduced to an application 
of this formula, together with the following syllogism: 
Bird(x) -+ LikeZyCanFly( x) 
Bird(Tweety) 
~i~e~~an~ly( Tweety ) 
This follows because the left side of the equivalence is the first premise of the orig- 
inal syllogism, and the right side of the equivalence is the first premise of the above 
syllogism. A key observation to be made here is that the latter syllogism follows by 
instantiating x with Tweety and applying ordinary (classical) Modus Ponens. This sug- 
gests that the desired fo~ulation of fuzzy quantification and fuzzy likelihood may be 
obtained merely by adjoining classical logic with an appropriate set of modifiers. It 
also suggests that the modifiers of interest may be introduced in the manner of either 
quantifiers or modal operators, and that the semantics for such a system could be based 
on some version of probability theory. 
A second observation is that there is a similar connation between the foregoing two 
concepts and the concept of usuality. Based on the same idea of a statistical sampling, 
one has that 
Usually, if something is a bird, then it can fly. 
is ~uivalent with the former two assertions. Thus one should be able to include usu- 
ality modifiers along with quantifiers and likelihood modifiers in a similar extension of 
classical logic. 
This is not to claim, of course, that such a system would capture the full range of 
meanings and nuances for these terms. In particular, an important distinction arises with 
regard to their temporal foci. To wit, usuality tends to be applied only in reference to 
past experiences, as in “It has usually been the case that a randomly selected bird can 
fly”, while quantification tends to be applied in statements about the present state of 
affairs, as in “Most birds can fly”, and likelihood is normally applied in reference to 
expectations about the future, ‘“If at some future time I randomIy select a bird, then 
it is likely that it will be able to fly”. In the context of such distinctions, the above 
interrelations reflect an implicit presumption that the relevant state of affairs with the 
population of all birds tends to remain more or less constant throughout time. What 
was true in the past, is mostly true now, and may be expected to remain true in the 
foreseeable future. In effect, both quantification and likelihood are pragmatically rooted 
in our perceptions of usuality. 
The system Q is an outgrowth of these various insights and reflections. In addition to 
the syllogisms illustrated in Section 1.2, it allows for expression of all similar syllogisms 
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Table I 
Interrelations across seven levels of the three kinds of modifiers 
~uallti~cation Usuality 
a11 alWayS 
almost all almost always 
most usually 
rr~any/about half frequently/o~en 
few/some occasionaIiy/seIdom 
almost no almost never/rarely 
no never 
Likelihood 
certainly 
almost certainly 
likely 
unce~in/about 50-W 
unfikely 
almost certainly not 
certainly not 
as represented by the tines of Table I (where the two “Tweety” examples are given by 
the third line, and the “Felix” example is given by first and last entry of the sixth line). 
Table 1 is meant only for illustrative purposes and could be modified in various ways. 
In particular, one could increase (or decrease) the granularity of distinction between 
levels by adding (or removing) lines. For example, between the second and third lines 
one might insert Yer)l mnn~, very often, vet likely, and in parallel between the fifth 
and sixth lines insert very few, verq’ seldom, very unlikely. What natural-language terms 
one puts in the various slots may also be at issue, partly because there is in some 
cases no completely appropriate choice. For example, it is not necessarily the case that 
many should be taken as synonymous with about half, or that few means the same as 
soiree. From the standpoint of the formalism presented below, the labels one puts in the 
various cells reflect a higher-level inte~retation, however. which play no official role in 
deductions. For the sake of perspicuity they of course should in principle conform to 
at least some version of common sense. The terms “typically” and “normally”, which 
appear frequently in the literature on nonmonotonic reasoning (Section 1)) could here 
be taken as synonyms for trsually. 
2.3. Languages 
We shall begin by defining the kind of languages to be employed. Let the mod- 
ifiers in Table 1, in top-down then left-right order, be represented by Q3, . . . , Q-3, 
~23,. . ,Li--3, 123,. _ . , C-3. As ~y~nbols select: an (~~dividufll) variable, denoted by x; 
countably infinitely many (individual) constunts, denoted generically by a, b, . . .; count- 
ably infinitely many unary predicate symbols, denoted generically by (Y, p, . . .; seven 
logical connectives, denoted by -1, V, A, +, -4, 1, and V; the abovementioned modifiers 
Qi, Z&, and C;; and parentheses and comma, denoted as usual. Let the formulas be the 
members of the sets 
6 = {a(x) / (Y is a predicate symbol), 
h=fi U{+XPVQ>,(PAQ) IRQEF$JF~},* 
2 This notation abbreviates the usual inductive definition, in this case the smallest class of formulas containing 
FL together with all formulas that can be built up from formulas in 4 in the three prescribed ways. 
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Fx={(f’--+ Q) / EQ E F& 
FJ={CII(Pic;Q),C3tP~QQ)lc~(P;uiQ), 
e3(P~~,c,Q),e?<P;eiQ),e~(PiUiQ), 
&(P ACiQ)t&,(P -A QiQ>t%(P A&Q) 
/P,QE F2UFj.i=-3 ,..., 3}, 
Fs={CiP,QiP,UiP 1 P,Q E F2UF3, i=-3,...,3}. 
F6=F4UF5U{=P,(P~Q) /P,QEF'uF~UF~}, 
F,' = (P(a/x) j P E Fj and a is an individual constant), 
F2/ = {P( n/x) 1 P E F2 and n is an individual constant}, 
F; = {P( n/x) 1 P E F3 and n is an individual constant}, 
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Fi = (Ln f P i .CiQ) (a/x) / C3 ( P 4 CiQ) E Fd and a is an individual constant}, 
F[ = {C;P(n/x) 1 P E Fsq n is an individual constant, and i = -3,. . . .3}, 
F;=F$J(+E(PiiQ) / EQ E y;uF;), 
where P(a/x) denotes the formula obtained from P by replacing every occurrence of 
the variable x with an occurrence of the constant n. As abbreviations take 
(PAQ) for I;(qPD+Q) 
(P-Q) for f?P’?Q> 
(PAQ) for ((PGQ)ii(QGP)) 
Parentheses may be dropped when the intended grouping is clear; associativity is as- 
sumed to be to the right. Formulas without modifiers are first- or lower-level formulas, 
and those with modifiers are second- or upper-lever. The members of the set FI U F: 
are elementar)l$rst- or lower-level formulas, and the members of F4 U Fi U F5 U Fi are 
elementary second- or upper-level formulas. A formula is open if it contains the variable 
x, and closed if not. 
By a language L is meant any collection of symbols and formulas as described above. 
Part of the rationale for these definitions is as follows. A formula of the form Ct P( u/x), 
applying a likelihood modifier to a closed formula, is intended to express “It is likely 
that the individual a satisfies the proposition P”, and a formula of the form Ct P, where 
P is open, expresses “For an arbitrary individual X, it is likely that x satisfies P”. A 
formula of the form &?t P, P open, expresses “For most x, P is true about 2’; similarly, 
L4r P, P open, expresses ~‘Us~l~li~ P is true about a?. The language does not allow 
the intuitively meaningless application of Q’s and U’s to closed formulas. Since these 
languages provide only one individual variable, there is no need to identify it along with 
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the modifier, e.g., as in (Fb~~Most x)P; in other words, when P is open, the x is implicit. 
When expressing propositions informally, however, it will sometimes be convenient to 
make the x explicit. 
In applying both to open and to closed formulas, likehhood behaves somewhat akin 
to a modality. By contrast, quantification and usuality apply only to open formulas, and 
thus behave as ordinary quantification. Since a modifier-free formula P is a lower-level 
formula, the convention is adopted that, in order to assert the proposition P at the second 
level, one writes C3 P (informally, CertuinlyP) . Further discussion of the idiosyncrasies 
of the foregoing definitions is best taken up in the context of the following presentation 
of the formal semantics (Section 2.4). 
Languages differ from one another essentially only in their choice of individual 
constants and predicate symbols. As an example, the first of the foregoing syllogisms 
can be written in a language employing the individual constant a for Tweety and the 
predicate symbols LY and p for Bird and CanFly-and for clarity writing these names 
instead of the symbols-as 
&(Bird(x) -+ CanFly( 
&Bird{ Tweety ) 
In words: For most x, if x is a Bird then x’ CanFly; it is certain that Tweety is a Bird; 
therefore it is likely that Tweety CanFly. 
2.4. The Bayesian semantics 
This section and the next define two alternative semantics for Q, one Bayesian and 
one non-Bayesian. The first will be the more general, but the second will be more useful 
for certain kinds of applications. In both semantics, an interpretation Z for a language L 
will consist of a likelihood mapping 11 which associates each lower-level formula with 
a number in [ 0, 11, and a truth valuation vI which associates each upper-level formula 
with a truth value, T or F. The subscript I will be dropped when the intended meaning 
is clear. 
Here the definition of 1 is based on the Bayesian subjectivist theory of probability 
as described in [ 132, pp. 29-341. A key feature of Bayesian theory is that it takes the 
notion of conditional probability as primitive. A likelihood mapping 1, for an inter- 
pretation I of a language L, will be any function defined on the lower-level formulas 
P of L, and the ordered pairs (QlP) of lower-level formulas of L, satisfying: for 
elementary P, 
l(P) E ro, 11 
for ordered pairs (Ql P) of formulas (elementary or not), 
I(QIP) E IO,11 
and, for any P and Q (elementary of not), 
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I(lP) = 1 -Z(P) 
l(P A Q, = f(QlP)l(f') 
I(PVQ) =I(P)+l<Q, -l(PAQ, 
I(f’ --f Q) = l(Qlf’) 
if 1(P) = r, then for any a, I(P(a/x)) = r 
l(QlJ')l(p) =l(plQ)l(Q) 
The value Z(P) is here taken to be the Bayesian degree of belief (in the truth) of P. The 
value I( Ql P) is taken to be the Bayesian conditional probability, which by definition 
is the degree of belief (in the truth) of P under the assumption that Q is known (to 
be true) with absolute certainty. Under this interpretation common sense would dictate 
that, if I(P) = 0, then 1( QlP) should be undefined. The last of the above equations is 
a reconstrual of the familiar “inversion formula” (see [ 132, p. 321) and ensures that 
A and V are commutative. The second from the last line asserts that, if a formula P 
involving the variable x is held with a certain degree of belief, then in the absence of 
any special information about an individual a, the formula P (a/x) will be held to the 
same degree. The issue of how to deal with the possibility of there being countervailing 
information about a plays a key role in the developments of Sections 4 and 5. The only 
thing left to make any such 1 a Bayesian probability function is to agree that “absolute 
certainty” will be represented by the value 1. 
The “triviality result” established by Lewis [93] was mentioned in Section 1.1. 
In the present context this may be summarized as follows: if the lower level of the 
foregoing languages were expanded to allow for nesting of conditionals, e.g., as in 
(P + (Q ----) R) ), then the foregoing semantics based on defining I( P --f Q) as 
equal to Z(QlP) could have at most 4 distinct likelihood values. This inherent limitation 
in the otherwise compelling idea of interpreting the logical conditional as conditional 
probability is the reason for defining the formula class F3 as in Section 2.3; it admits a 
probabilistic conditional while avoiding triviality simply by ensuring that the nesting of 
such conditionals is disallowed. 
To define the valuation mapping u, one must first select, for each i = -3,. . . ,3, a 
likelihood interval pi C [ 0, 1 ] in the manner of 
Lj = [ 1, 1 ] (singleton 1) , 
L2 = [$, I), 
LI = c&g, 
Lo=($,$), 
L-1 = t;, $1, 
L-2 = u+l, 
L-3 = [O,O] (singleton 0). 
These intervals then become associated with the corresponding modifiers. Their choice 
is largely arbitrary, but should in principle be guided either by intuition or experimental 
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results (e.g., based on psychological studies of the kind cited in Section 2.1). The only 
formal requirement is that they be nonoverlapping and cover the interval [O, 11. Given 
such a set of intervals, the mapping u is defined by, for all i = -3,. . . ,3: for open 
lower-level P, Q, and with M being any of C, Q, or U, 
c(M3(PiMiQ) =T iff I(P + Q) E Li 
for closed lower-level P and Q, 
u(C,(PALiQ)) =T iff l(P + Q) E L; 
for open lower-level P and M being any of C, e, or U, 
u(MiP) = T iff l(P) E pi 
for closed lower-level P, 
U(CiP) = T iff 1(P) E pi 
and for open or closed upper-level P and Q, 
u(+P) =T iff u(P) = F 
u(P’;iQ) =T iff either u(P) =T or u(Q) =T 
It is not difficult to verify that this provides a well-defined semantics for the languages in 
concern. Note that a second-level formula is either T or F, so that this part of the system 
is classical. This justifies introducing A, A, and A in the manner that is customary 
for classical logic, i.e., via the abbreviations given in Section 2.3. By contrast, at the 
lower level there is no similarly convenient syntactical way to express the definition 
of I( P V Q) in terms of I( P A Q), so that there the two connectives must be defined 
separately. 
Note also that these languages rule out compound modifiers such as likely likely and 
for most x, likely. This was done in order to confine the discussion to the simpler case. 
Such could be introduced, however, by extending to a semantics employing probabilities 
of probabilities. Pearl [ 132, pp. 357-3721 explains a sense in which it is meaningful to 
do this, and that approach could be applied here to provide the needed interpretations. 
Such modifier combinations rarely occur in everyday discourse, however, so it is not a 
great loss to leave them out. 
To illustrate this semantics, let us verify in detail that the foregoing syllogism regarding 
Tweety is valid in any such interpretation I, i.e. that if the premises of the syllogism 
are both T in I, then so also will be the conclusion. It will be seen that validity in 
this example is a direct result of associating &i (most) and Ci (likely) with the same 
likelihood interval. Suppose I is such that 
u( Qi (Bird(x) 4 CanFly( = T 
u (CsBird( Tweety ) ) = T 
From the latter we obtain by definition of u that 
I(Bird(Tweety)) = 1 
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which means that Bird(Tweety) is absolutely certain. From the former we obtain by 
definition of u that 
I(Bird(x) - CanFly( E ~~ 
By definition of 1, this gives 
I(Bird(Tweety) -+ CanFly(Tweety)) E ~1 
whence 
I(CanFly(Tweety) IBird(Tweety)) E LI 
In accordance with Bayesian theory, the latter means that the degree of belief in Can- 
Fly(Tweety), given that Bird(Tweety) is absolutely certain, is in ~1. This, together 
with the above certainty about Tweety being a bird, yields that the degree of belief in 
CanFly(Tweety) must also be in pi. Then, by definition of 1, 
I(CanFly(Tweety)) E LI 
giving, by definition of V, that 
u(LtCanFly(Tweety)) = T 
This is what we were required to show. 
In general, it is a direct consequence of the definition of o is that the semantics 
validates classical Modus Ponens at the upper level, namely 
P’;Q 
P 
Q 
for all P, Q E F6 U F& and it is a direct consequence of the definitions of 1 and u that 
the semantics validates the Substitution Rule 
P 
P(alx) 
for all P E F6 involving only L’s (i.e., no Q’s or U’s). 
A second-level proposition P will be valid if u(P) = T for all such interpretations I. 
It is routine to verify that all second-level formulas having the form of tautologies of 
classical propositional calculus are valid. It is also easy to verify that the following are 
valid for all choices of i (and open P): 
LiP +G Q,P 
CcP &UiP 
&,P Azd;P 
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The need for the single-dotted conditional i, introduced in F4, arose from a desire to 
express certain propositions which could not otherwise be stated. For example, suppose 
one wishes to express the equivalence described informally in Section 2.2 as 
(Most ~)(Bird(x) -+ CanFly( H (Bird(x) + LikelyCanFly( x) ) 
The first 4 would naturally be here represented formally as the undotted +, and the H 
would naturally be transcribed as the formal H, but without the formal 4, there would 
be no way to transcribe the second +. Thus even though at the semantic level, -+ and 
i are interpreted equivalently, at the syntactic level they play very distinct roles. In 
general, the semantics validates all formulas having the forms (for open P and Q): 
Collectively, these express salient aspects of the interrelations between quantification, 
likelihood, and usuality. 
Another general form validated by this semantics is 
This is established by: 
u(Qi(P 4 Q)) =T 
iff Z(P + Q) E L; (definition of v) 
iff Z(QlP) E L; (definition of I) 
iff l(P) = 1 implies l(Q) E L; (Bayes conditional) 
iff c(Cs(P)) = T implies U(LiQ) = T (definition of u) 
iff U( CsP -IL1 LiQ) = T (classical propositional calculus) 
One also has that negations behave in intuitively plausible ways. In particular, for all i, 
we have 
C,P tli CiY7P 
LiP cli L_i7P 
(similarly for &?‘s and U’s), and where jr,. . . , j, are the subscripts # i, 
I;cip cli c.i, p v. . . Ti CjhP 
The first of these expresses the usual property of double negations. By taking i = 2, the 
second expresses the common-sense proposition that likely is equivalent with unlikely 
not, and by taking i = -2, one has that unlikely is equivalent with likely not. Suppose 
that in the same schema, with & in place of C, we take i = -3. This gives 
(ForNo x)PA(ForAll X)TP 
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from which it follows by propositional calculus that 
Y(ForNo x)P Gl;(ForAll X)TP 
Now suppose we introduce (ForSome x) P as an abbreviation for ‘( ForNo x) P. Then 
we have 
(ForSome x) P C+ ‘( ForAll x) 7P 
revealing ForSome and ForAll as probabilistic analogs of the classical 3 and V. This 
seems intuitively correct, inasmuch as (ForAll x) P is true iff the probability of P is 1, 
and (ForSome x) P is true iff the probability of P is not 0. 
The latter of the above three schemata conforms with ordinary intuition at the sec- 
ond (classical) level. There are, however, various related common-sense propositions 
which do not hold in the present formalism. For example, even though one can express 
both of 
?Likely P C+ Unlikely P 
(ForAll x) P -t( ForMost x) P 
neither of these are valid. It seems reasonable that one could obtain such expressions by 
introducing alternative versions of likely and most, e.g., a Likely2 and a ForMost2, but 
this has not yet been explored. 
The daunting task of establishing a semantically complete axiomatization for Q also 
has yet to be attempted. For purposes of the reasoning systems discussed in this paper, 
however, even though having an axiomatization would be desirable, it is not actually 
required. One can still perform effective reasoning in spite of the system’s being incom- 
plete. Nevertheless, additional inference rules will surely be useful. In particular, one 
would likely want to adjoin the rules developed by Amarger et al. (Section 2.1) for 
chaining inferences involving fuzzy quantifiers. 
The decision to employ only one individual variable was made in order to confine 
the analysis to the simplest case. Having now developed the one-variable case, it should 
not be difficult the extend this treatment to the use of multiple variables and nary 
predicates. Even in its present form, however, the system is not without utility. As will 
become evident in the sections that follow, it already provides a fairly rich semantics, 
and may well in itself lead to a new class of expert systems. Indeed virtually all real- 
world expert systems go little beyond ordinary propositional calculus, and in any case 
are never applied to more than one individual at a time. 
2.5. The counting semantics 
Whenever one uses a quantifier in everyday conversation, there is an implicit reference 
to an underlying domain of discourse. This observation evidently served as the basis 
for Zadeh’s original formulation of fuzzy quantification (Section 2.1). For example, 
“Most birds can fly” refers to a domain of individuals which is presumed to include a 
collection of birds, and an assertion to the effect that there is a “high probability” that 
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a randomly chosen bird will be able to fly (Section 2.2) is represented mathematically 
by the condition that a “large proportion” of birds are able to fly. 
Unfortunately, the semantics developed in the preceding section does not reflect this 
type of meaning. While Bayesian theory insists on a purely subjectivist interpretation of 
probabilities as degrees of belief, however, there is nothing that rules out the statistical 
intuitions discussed earlier. Indeed the theory does not say anything about how one’s 
degrees of belief are to be determined; it says only that they must be chosen in such a 
way that they conform to certain laws. 
The present section develops an alternative semantics which explicitly portrays the 
role of the underlying domain. This counting semantics arises by restricting Zadeh’s 
notion of “cT-count” to crisp predicates (see Section 2.1) . 
An interpretation I for a language L will now consist of: a universe U, of individuals 
(here assume U, is finite) ; assignment of a unique individual al E U, to each individual 
constant a of L; assignment of a unique unary predicate CY~ on U, to each predicate 
symbol LY of L; a likelihood mapping 1, which associates each lower-level formula with 
a number in [ 0, 1 ] ; and a truth valuation UI which associates each upper-level formula 
with a truth value, T or F. As before, the subscript I will be dropped when the intended 
meaning is clear. 
Given assignments for the individual constants and predicate symbols, the mappings 
1 and L' are defined in the following way. Observe that the assignments LYI induce 
the assignment of a unique subset PI of U, to each (open) formula in F2 accord- 
ing to 
(,P)/ = (8)’ 
(PVQ)I=P/‘JQJ 
(PAQ>/=P/nQr 
For subsets X C: U, define a proportional size cr by 
4X) = IXlllUl 
where 1 I denotes cardinality. Then 1 is defined by: for P E F2, 
l(P) = 4P/) 
for (P + Q) E F3, 
l(P + Q, = dp/ f- Q,)/dp~) 
with 1 undefined if (T( P,) = 0; and for P E F2 U F3, 
if l(P) = r, then l(P(a/x)) = r 
It is easy to see that c is a probability function. These definitions merely replicate 
the standard way of defining probability where events are represented as subsets of a 
universe of alternative possibilities. The value a( P,) is defined to be the probability that 
a randomly selected a, in U, will be in PI. This means that, for each a and each open 
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P E F2, and given no additional information about a, I( P (a/x) ) is the probability that 
al E P,. The definition of l(P 4 Q) is the traditional (non-Bayesian) way of defining 
conditional probability in terms of joint events (see [ 132, p. 311). Thus the value of 
this ratio is, by definition, the probability that an individual al will be in Q,, given that 
a, is known to be in P,. 
Assuming this version of 1, the corresponding v is defined exactly as in Section 2.4. 
It is a routine matter to verify that this semantics validates all the same syllogisms 
and formulas as were considered in Section 2.4. (This is not to say, however, that the 
two semantics are necessarily equivalent with respect to the given class of languages 
L, an issue which as yet remains unresolved.) To illustrate, the “Tweety” syllogism is 
established as follows. As before, assume that both premises have .value T. Letting Pr 
denote probability, we have 
u(&ii(Bird(x) -+CanFly(x)) =T 
iff 1(Bird(x) + CanFly( E ~1 (definition of ~1) 
iff a(Bird, n CanFlyl) E ~1 (definition of I) 
iff Vu,, Pr( a, E Bird,) = 1 implies Pr( a, E CanFly) E pi (non-Bayes cond.) 
iff Vu, I( Bird( a) ) = 1 implies I( CanFly (a) ) E L, (discussion above) 
iff Vu, v(LsBird(a)) = T implies v(fZiCanFly(a)) = T (definition of v) 
Then taking the last line with Tweety as an instance of a and combining this with the 
second premise of the syllogism gives the desired result. The other items validated in 
Section 2.4 may be dealt with by similar techniques. 
It would be easy to implement such a mapping u in any database; one need only 
scan records and perform counts wherever appropriate. In other types of applications, 
however (e.g., many expert systems), the underlying universe will be such that it is not 
possible to count the numbers of objects that satisfy certain relations. For example, it 
is not known exactly how many birds there are in the world, nor how many of them 
can fly. Hence instead of basing the likelihood valuation 1 on actual counts, it would 
be more reasonable to define it in terms of estimates of sizes of populations. Such 
estimates might be arrived at by means of statistical samplings; alternatively, they might 
be subjective estimates of relative sizes, essentially educated guesses, not necessarily 
based on any deeper methodology. In the latter case one is nearing a return to the 
type of reasoning portrayed by the Bayesian semantics. The counting semantics would 
nonetheless be useful in this context, inasmuch as the principles of set theory can be 
used to help ensure that these estimates are selected in intuitively plausible ways. For 
example, if A’s are known to always be B’s, then in any valid interpretation the set of 
A’s should be a subset of the set of B’s. Such an approach might be characterized as 
subjective, but non-Bayesian. 
The restriction to finite universes was made in order to define the counting semantics 
in terms of relative cardinalities. It seems reasonable that one could extend to infinite do- 
mains via an abstract measure-theoretic formulation of probability, as in Kolomogorov’s 
treatise [ 841. 
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3. The classical modalities 
The modern study of the modalities possibly and necessarily began in the 1920’s with 
the works of C.I. Lewis (see [92] ). This eventually grew into an extensive literature, 
with the majority of studies being based on the “possible worlds” semantics introduced 
by Kripke [ 85,861. Under this interpretation, a proposition P is “necessary” if it is true 
in all possible worlds, and is “possible” if it is true in at least one possible world. A 
standard reference is [ 801; more recent summaries and surveys include [ 170,179,183]. 
The modalities studied in those works are here termed “classical” to distinguish them 
from the lesser-known probabilistic variety. 
The connection between probability theory and the classical modalities has been 
explored by Rescher [ 1511. There a semantics is presented wherein propositions P 
have two-place “truth values”, (V(P), Pr( P) ), where V(P) is the ordinary truth value 
of P ( 1 for true and 0 for false), and Pr( P) is the probability of P’s being true. The two 
items are regarded as independent of one another, with the exception that, if Pr( P) = 1, 
then V(P) must be 1, and if Pr( P) = 0, then V(P) = 0. A proposition of the form 
Nec( P) (P is necessav) is assigned the V-value I if Pr( P) = 1, and 0 if not. A 
proposition of the form Pos( P) (P is possible) is assigned the V-value 0 if Pr( P) = 0, 
and 1 if not. The Pr-values of Nec( P) and Pos( P) are defined to be the same as their 
V-values. Thus P is necessary iff its probability is 1, and P is possible iff its probability 
is not 0. Based on these ideas, Rescher defined the notion of an “M-tautology” and 
showed that the M-tautologies are just the theorems of the well-known modal logic S5. 
As has become customary, necessity will be denoted by 0 and possibility by 0. There 
are two options for extending the system Q to accommodate expressions involving these 
modifiers: (i) add 0 and 0 to the symbol set, and formally introduce propositions of 
the form q IP and OP into the set of allowable formulas, or (ii) employ 0 and 0 as 
a means of abbreviating formulas having certain forms. It will be more convenient to 
adopt the latter approach. Let us take 
CIP for L3P 
UP for x-jP 
It is easily verified that 
u(OP) =T iff I(P) = 1 
o( OP) = T iff l(P) > 0 
Thus these definitions are in accordance with the same intuitions as motivated Rescher. 
The present aim is to determine the extent to which these versions of possibility and 
necessity satisfy the same properties as the versions encoded by the well-known systems 
K, S4, and S5 (the formulations used here are from van Benthem’s monograph [ 1831). 
The language for these systems uses the connectives 1, 4, 0, and 0, together with a 
collection PL = {P’, P”, . .} of propositional letters, and consists of the set of formulas 
F =PLu (18 (P +Q),WOP]P,QEPLUF} 
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For system K, the axioms are (i) all formulas having the form of classical tautologies, 
(ii) all “definitions” of the form 
and (iii) all formulas of the form 
q (P -+ Q) + (UP + q Q) 
The inference rules are Modus Ponens and Necessitation (from P infer UP). System 
S4 is obtained from K by adjoining the axioms schemata (iv) q P -+ P and (v) 
q P -+ q OP. S5 is obtained from S4 by adjoining (vi) OOP + P. 
Section 2.4 mentioned that all propositional tautologies of Q are valid. This verifies 
item (i). The analog of item (ii) is 
A detailed proof of validity for formulas having this form is as follows. 
u(qO7P) = T iff v(X37P) = T (definition of 0) 
iff u(L~3lP) = F (definition of u) 
iff I(-P) @ ~3 (definition of L’) 
iff l(-P) # 1 (definition of ~3) 
iff 1 - l(P) # 1 (definition of I) 
iff Z(P) f 0 
iff Z(P) 6 ~-3 (definition of ~-3) 
iff u(C-3P) = F (definition of U) 
iff u(X_sP) = T (definition of u) 
iff u( OP) = T (definition of 0) 
In the same manner one may establish validity for 
clp C+ ‘;07p 
The analog of axiom form (iii) is 
q (P 4 Q) A(oPAnQ) 
the validity of which can also be established using methods similar to the above. 
In Section 2.4 it was noted that Modus Ponens is valid for Q. Necessitation in the 
form stated above would not be meaningful for Q, since first-level formulas do not have 
truth values. However, the conventional sense of a propositional variable P standing 
alone is simply to assert (the truth of) P, and (as also discussed in Section 2.4) this 
may be captured in Q by the formula 
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expressing “CertainlyP”. Building on this one has, by the definitions, validity for 
L3P 
QP 
Using the same rationale, an analog for axiom (iv) would be UP A&P, which is also 
valid. 
Thus we have captured all of K and most of S4. Unfortunately, no analogs of axioms 
(v) and (vi) are expressible in Q. This is clearly a limitation, but similarly as for the 
compound modifiers discussed in Section 2.4, it may be argued that this drawback is 
not severe. Propositions like “necessarily necessarily P” or “possibly necessarily P” 
almost never arise in everyday reasoning, and hence a capacity to express them would 
seldom be missed. Note nonetheless that if Q were expanded in the manner discussed 
previously, to a semantics accommodating probabilities of probabilities, then even these 
more complex propositions could also be expressed. 
Last note that the present formulation allows for propositions that cannot be expressed 
in the classical systems. In particular, we have 
which interrelate necessity and possibility with quantification. Also, where ForSome is 
as defined in Section 2.4. we have 
(ForSome x) P cli OP 
which expresses the intuitive relationship between 0 and 3. 
4. Path logics 
The motivation and main ideas underlying the notion of a path logic were discussed 
in Section 1. As was mentioned, it is necessary not only that the path be allowed to 
grow over time, but also so should the language. For example, in order for a path logic 
to receive the proposition (Most x>Bird(x) -+ CanFly from an external source, it is 
necessary that the language include predicate symbols for Bird and CanFly. Hence if it 
doesn’t, these must be added. In addition it will be useful to allow that inference rules 
be added, e.g., some new rules for modifier combination. Accordingly a path logic will 
be focalized as a sequence of triples (language, path, rule set) indexed by the discrete 
time steps in which they are formed. 
The general notion of path logic is intended to be completely unrestricted regarding 
both the kinds languages that may be employed and the ways in which the language 
may be modified. For example, one might start out with a first-order language, then 
at some point add modal operators, and at later point introduce second-order features. 
To illustrate the key ideas, however, if will be enough to consider only the kinds of 
languages defined in Section 2.3. 
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Let a labeled formula be a pair (P, A), where P is a second-level formula as defined 
in Section 2.3, and h is the label. In this section, h will be a 4-tuple (i,fr, to, s), where 
i is an index, fr is a from list, to is a to list, and s is a status indicator. Each of these 
items will be described in detail below; here only note that the index i will always be a 
nonnegative integer. Further items will be added to the label in Sections 6 and 7. 
By a language L is now meant a set of labeled formulas. Precisely, if P is a formula 
in a language as defined in Section 2.3, and A is any admissible label for P, then (P, A) 
is a formula of the corresponding language of the present type. In addition, we shall 
assume that languages include all formulas of the form (I, A), where I is a special 
second-level symbol standing forfalsehood. Let n denote the class of all such languages. 
Inference rules are now defined only on labeled (second-level) formulas. In effect, 
rules are mappings from languages into themselves, stating how labeled formulas having 
certain forms may be derived from labeled formulas having certain other forms. As 
examples, two rules applicable to all languages in 4 would be the following versions of 
Modus Ponens and the Substitution Rule: for all second-level P and Q, 
(P-it Ah) 
cc A’) 
(Q, A”) 
where it is understood that the index in A” must be larger than the indices in A and A’, 
and for second-level P involving only C’s, 
tPtdx>, A’) 
where the index of the conclusion must be larger than the index of the premise. Let @ 
be the class of all inference rules definable on the languages in A. 
A path logic L bused on n and @ consists of a series of triples (Li, 7~,, &> generated 
in the following way. Let La be the language with no individual constants and no 
predicate symbols, let ~0 be the empty sequence, and let 40 be the empty set. Assume 
one has formed (L,_r , n,,_l, &_I ) , for n 3 1. Suppose 7~,_.i is the sequence of labeled 
formulas (PI, Al ), . . . , ( P,_I , A,,_1 ) . The language L, is formed from _&,._I by adding 
finitely many (and possibly no) new individual constants and predicate symbols. The 
rule set 4,, is formed from ~#+_l by possibly adding some new inference rules defined 
on L,. The path z-,, is formed by adding a new labeled formula (P,,, A,,) to the path 
n-,,_ 1, where P,, is either (i) arbitrarily chosen from L,, i.e., is received from an external 
source, or (ii) derived from formulas in n-,-t by application of an inference rule in c#,,, 
with the proviso that formulas can only be used as premises if their status indicators 
s are set to on. The index i in label A,, is just the integer II, indicating the formula’s 
position in the sequence. In case P,, was received from without, the from-listfr is simply 
{ret}. In case P,, was derived from formulas Pi, , . . . , Pi,, by applying inference rule cp, 
then fr = {cp, il, . . , &}. Also in this case, the to-list for each of the Pi, is augmented 
by adding the integer IZ. The to-list for P,, is temporarily empty. The status indicator s 
for P, is initially set to on. 
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The from-lists and to-lists allow one to trace through all derivations, either backwards 
or forwards, and are intended to be used for various forms of reason maintenance (see 
Sections 1, 5, and 7.4). A way in which these may be used in the context of modifier 
combination is discussed below. Examples illustrating the general use of labeled formulas 
appear in Section 5. 
In an implementation, it might be convenient to expand the above definitions to 
allow also for adding formula schemata to the path. Let S(Al,. . . , A,,) be a schema 
involving the variables Ai, which are taken as ranging over all possible formulas. For 
example, (Al G( A2 * AI ) ) is a schema representing the general fom of all formulas 
(P A( Q i P) ). The schemata would be used in conjunction with a rule providing for 
schema instantiation: 
(SCPI,... ,P,,/AI,...,&),A) 
for any formulas PI,. . . , P,,. A typical use would be to initialize a path with schemata 
for the axioms of classical propositional calculus. Then the rule could be applied to 
derive individual axioms as they are desired, thus avoiding the need to input each such 
axiom from without. 
The notions of interpretation defined in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 may be extended to 
path logics in the following manner. Let I be defined as before, but now from labeled 
first-level formulas into [ 0, 11, and with the part of the definition regarding substitution 
instances removed. This means that there is now no intrinsic connection between the 
likelihood of a formula P and that of its instances P( a/x). Let u be a valuation mapping 
for labeled second-level formulas that is defined in terms of 1 exactly as before, with 
the added provision that, for all A, u( I, h) = F. It follows that the truth of an instance 
CiP(a/x) is no longer dependent on the truth of CiP. 
Let I be an interpretation for a path logic L. When a formula is received into the path, 
it is natural to assume that its truth value is T. Then if all the rules being applied are 
truth-preserving, it is automatic that all the formulas in the path will be true. It turns out, 
however, that there will be occasion to allow rules which permit I to be derived from 
true premises. A specific example appearing below is the rule for combining Certainly 
with CertainlyNot. It was here decided to regard this combination as contradictory, and 
this decision is made formal in a rule saying the from (CsP, A) and (C-3P’, A) one 
may infer (I, A”). 
A rule application in L will be valid with respect to I if the conclusion in that 
application is T. Let us say that a sequence of formulas 7r generated in the manner 
of the foregoing definition of path is correct, and similarly that the rule applications 
involved in generating this path are correct. It follows that a rule application may be 
correct, but invalid. Let us say that a path is valid in I if all its formulas whose status 
indicators are OIZ are true in I. The intention underlying these definitions is that one 
wants always that, with respect to a certain motivating interpretation, the path will remain 
valid. Thus, whenever a correct but invalid inference is detected by the appearance of 
a I, this signals an invalidity which must somehow be eradicated. Possible ways in 
which this might be done are (i) simply ignore the contradiction by switching the 
D.G. SchwartzJArtijkial Intelligence 93 (1997) 103-167 
Table 2 
Sample rules for combining likelihood modifiers 
3 2 I 0 -1 -2 -3 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 * 
2 3 2 2 2 2 0 -3 
I 3 2 1 I 0 -2 -3 
0 3 2 I 0 -I -2 -3 
-1 3 2 0 -I -I -2 -3 
-2 3 0 -2 -2 -2 -2 -3 
-3 * -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 
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status indicator of the derived (I, h) to 08, (ii) invoke a Doyle-like form of reason 
maintenance (e.g., work backwards through from-lists to uncover one or more offending 
earlier propositions, then switch off the status indicators of all formulas from the derived 
falsehood back to the chosen culprit(s), and finally work forward through to-lists from 
all formulas just switched off, switching off all formulas which were derived as their 
consequences), or (iii) similarly as in (ii) except instead of switching all formulas off, 
possibly just revise their likelihood modifiers. A concrete example appears regarding the 
Nixon Diamond puzzle in Section 5. How best to deal with contradictions in general is 
reserved for future works. 
The issue of modifier combination is akin to that of evidence combination. The 
situation in concern is where, at some point in a path, one has derived Lip, and 
at another point one has derived CjP, and it is desired to introduce a rule which 
says how one might combine these to deduce a formula CkP, where Lk is derived in 
some meaningful manner from Ci and L,i. How one might go about this is somewhat 
arbitrary, since there is no established methodology for this kind of reasoning; here one 
must rely on one’s own sense of what seems reasonable. A collection of intuitively 
plausible such rules is described in Table 2. This is read: given i and j as above, the 
corresponding k is the entry in the ith row and jth column. For example, the entry 0 in 
the number 1 (third) row and the number - 1 (fifth) column of the table describes the 
rule 
Ll(P,A) 
c-1 (p, A’) 
Lo(P, A”) 
which say that if P is both likely and unlikely, then P is uncertain. The “*” in the upper 
right and lower left corners indicate the contradictory situation where P is both certainly 
and certainly not the case. This represents a rule of the kind mentioned above, having a 
conclusion of the form (I, A”). In applying any such rule it is required that the status 
indicators of the premises, i.e., where they appear in the path, must be changed to o& 
Recall from the definition of path logic that the status of the rule’s conclusion is always 
initially 012. This ensures that only the more current information will be used in future 
derivations. 
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All applications of rules portrayed in Table 2, excepting the two yielding falsehood, 
will be valid with respect to any interpretation I whose likelihood mapping 1 satisfies: 
where ,& is derived from C, and L,j, if l(Li, A) = ri and l(Lj, A’) = r,,, then rk = 
l(ck, A”) is 
undefined, if(ri=landr,j=O)or(r,,=landr;=O) 
1, if (ri = 1 and r,, # 0) or (ri = 1 and r; # 0) 
0, if(ri=Oandr.j# l)or(r,=Oandri# 1) 
max]ri, rjl, if ri, Y,j 3 0 
min[ ri, rj], if ri, ‘j < 0 
(ri + r,j) /2, otherwise 
The intuition underlying this scheme is that the values 1 and 0 should be dominant. More 
exactly, except for the contradictory situations, if either value is 1 or 0, then that value 
dominates the combination; if both lean toward 1 or both toward 0 (relative to l/2), 
then the value closest to that extremity dominates; otherwise the values are regarded as 
partly confirming and partly disconfirming, and so serve to cancel each other out. 
The above combination scheme evinces a measure of common-sense appeal, but other 
equally plausible schemes can surely be devised. For example, one could use a set 
of rules based on the fuzzy sets interpretation of likelihood proposed originally by 
Zadeh [ 199,200,203]. Alternatively one might want to base the rules on the results 
of psychological studies of the kind cited in Section 2.1. Clearly, the choice of a par- 
ticular combination scheme will be at least partially context-dependent, and different 
schemes will be more appropriate for different applications. In any case, the foregoing 
is intended only to lay down a general methodology for defining such modifier combi- 
nation rules, and not to argue that any particular set of rules should be preferred over 
another. 
5. Dynamic reasoning systems 
As described in Section 1, reasoning is nonmonotonic when the discovery of new 
information causes one to go back and retract old conclusions. To illustrate, suppose we 
are given that Opus is a bird, where it is known that birds can fly; then we naturally 
conclude that Opus can fly. But next suppose we are given the additional information 
that Opus is a penguin, where it is known that penguins are exceptional among birds in 
that they cannot fly. Now we are compelled to go back and retract the former conclusion 
about Opus’ flying ability, and affirm instead that he cannot. 
The earlier discussion indicated that nonmonotonic reasoning already enjoys a history 
covering more than a quarter of a century and that it has grown into a complex and mul- 
tifaceted field of research. The aim in this section is to lay out a method for formalizing 
a particular variety of nonmonotonicity, namely, that which arises in inheritance-based 
default reasoning. An outline of how these same methods may be extended to other 
types of nonmonotonic reasoning appears in Section 9. 
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Let the foregoing notion of a language L now be expanded to allow that predi- 
cate symbols are typed so as to distinguish between predicates representing properties 
of things and those representing kinds. In addition, allow that property-type predicate 
symbols may be assigned an integer index, the use of which will be explained below. 
The decision as to when a predicate should be treated as representing a kind versus a 
property is left to the system’s user. This distinction will often be somewhat arbitrary, 
but also at least partially context-dependent. The user is thus required to intervene with 
his or her own measure of common sense. This shortcoming notwithstanding, predicate 
typing has the important advantage that when it is used properly, many of the anomalies 
afllicting earlier multiple-inheritance systems can be avoided. Several examples will ap- 
pear shortly illustrating these facts. Kind and property predicate symbols are indicated, 
respectively, by superscripts ( k) and (p) . 
A multiple-inheritance hierarchy ZJ will consist of a set of nodes, together with a set 
of links represented as ordered pairs of nodes. Nodes may be either individual nodes, 
kind nodes, or property nodes. A link of the form (individual node, kind node) will be 
an element-of link; one of the form (kind node, kind node) will be a subset-of link; and 
one of the form (individual node, property node) or of the form (kind node, property 
node) will be a property-of link. There will be no other types of links. An individual 
node may enter into element-of links with any number of different kind nodes. A kind 
node may enter into subset-of links with any number of other kind-nodes, as long 
as this will not create loops. In the following, individual nodes will be labeled with 
individual constants, kinds nodes will be labeled with kind-type predicate symbols, and 
property nodes will be labeled with property-type predicate symbols bearing indices. 
Subset-of and property-of links will be labeled with quantifiers or likelihood modifiers 
as appropriate. 
Given such a v, there is defined on the individual nodes and the kind nodes a speci$city 
relation >s (read “more specific than”) according to: (i) if (nodet, nodez) E v is either 
an element-of link or a subset-of link, then node, >$ nodez, and (ii) if node, >,? node2 
and node:! >,s nodes, then node, >.s nodes. We shall also have a dual generality relation 
># (read “more general than”) defined by node1 >g node2 iff node1 cs nodel. It follows 
that individual nodes are maximally specific and minimally general. It also follows that 
v may have any number of maximally general nodes, and in fact that it need not be 
connected. A maximally general node is called a root node. A path in a hierarchy v 
(not to be confused with the path in a path logic) will be a sequence node1 , . . , node, 
wherein node, is a root node and, for each i = 1,. . . , n - 1, the pair (nodei,, , nodei) is 
either an element-of link or a subset-of link. Two distinct paths will form a redundant 
pair if they have some node in common beyond the first place where they differ. This 
means that they comprise two distinct paths to the common node(s). A path will be 
simply redundant (or redundant in v) if it is a member of a redundant pair. A path 
having more than one occurrence of the same node is said to contain a loop. Provisions 
are made in the following to ensure that hierarchies with loops or redundant paths are 
not allowed. As is customary, the hierarchies will be drawn as directed graphs, with 
the upward direction being from more specific to less (less general to more), so that 
roots appear at the top and individuals appear at the bottom, and with property-of links 
extending horizontally from their associated individual or kind nodes. 
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In terms of the above specificity relation on V, we can assign an address to each indi- 
vidual and kind node in the folIowing manner. Let the addresses of the root nodes, in any 
order, be ( l), (2), (3), . . . . Then for, say the node with address ( l), let the next most 
specific nodes in any order have the addresses ( 1,l) , ( 1,2), ( 1,3), . . .; let the nodes 
next most specific to the one with address ( I,1 ) have addresses ( 1, I, 1), ( 1, 1,2), 
(1,1,3),...; and so on. Thus a address indicates the node’s position in the hierarchy 
relative to some root node. Inasmuch as an individual or kind node may be more spe- 
cific than several different root nodes, the same node may have more than one such 
address. Note that the successive initial segments of an address are the addresses of 
the nodes appearing in the path from the related root node to the node having that 
rank. Let > denote the usual lexicographic order on addresses. We shall apply > 
also to the nodes having those addresses. It is easily verified that node] > node2 iff 
node, >$ nodez. For property and kind nodes, we shall use the term specifci~ rank 
(or just rank) synonymously with “address”. Having thus defined specificity ranks for 
individual and kind nodes, let us agree that each property node inherits the rank of the 
individual or kind node to which it is linked. Thus for property nodes the rank is not 
an address. 
We are now in a position to make the notion of dynamic reasoning system completely 
rigorous. By a dynamic reasoning system (DRS) will be meant a path logic, with 
language expanded as above, together with a sequence of multiple-inheritance hierarchies 
VJ,Vl?... constructed in tandem with the path-logic triples (La, ~0, &a>, ( LI , T~,+I ), 
. . . as follows. Let va be the hierarchy with no nodes or links. Assume one has formed 
(G,-~+~,,-I,#+~-I) and G-I. C onsider the new proposition P,, that is added to form 
path r,,. The hierarchy Y, is formed in accordance with: 
( I) If P,, is of the form Cla ck) (a), and this formula has not previously appeared 
in the path ~~~-1, then add an individual node for the individual constant a and 
a kind node for the predicate symbol LY (‘1 if these do not already exist in the 
hierarchy Y,_I, and add an element-of link connecting them. 
(2) IfP,, isoftheform &3(crCk)(~) d/3 (k) (x) ), and this formula has not previously 
appeared in the path 7r,,_.,, then add kind nodes for the predicate symbols aCk) 
and /3ck) if these do not already exist in ~,,_i, add a subset-of link connecting 
them (i.e., from cu(@ to Ptk)), and label the link with the quantifier &3, but with 
the provisions: 
(a) if this creates a loop in any path in Y, then the link just added must be 
removed, 
(b) if this creates a redundant path in v then: consider the two paths in the 
redundant pair; let node,,. _ . , nodek and node;, . . . , node:, be their respec- 
tive initial segments, leading from the root up to the first node they have in 
common beyond the place where they differ; if k < k’ (k’ < k), remove 
from v the link (nodek_ 1, nodek) (the link (node;,_ ], node:, 1). 
(3) If P, is of the form Ci,““( a) (or of the form Ci-cz”“(a>), if this formula has 
not previously appeared in the path ?rfl_ 1, and if &PI does not bear an index, 
then add an indi~~idual node for the individual constant a if one does not already 
exist in v,,_ ], add a property node for the predicate symbol &‘I (or TC@)), add 
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the appropriate property-of link, and label this link with the likelihood modifier 
Cj. In addition, if this is the kth appearance in Y of a property node for either 
the predicate symbol c&‘) or its negation, affix this symbol with the index k, 
both where it occurs on the node and where it appears in P,,. 
(4) If P, is of the form &i(cw(@(~) + ,@‘(x)) (or Qi(aCk’(X) --t -,@)(.a+))), 
if this formula has not previously appeared in the path rr,,_t, and if p(l)) does 
not bear an index, then add a kind node for (Y (k) if one does not already exist in 
v,,_ 1, add a property node for p(p) (or lp(P) ) , add the appropriate property-of 
link, and label the link with the quantifier Qi. In addition, if this is the kth 
appearance in v of a property node for either the predicate symbol p(J’) or its 
negation, label this symbol with the index k, both where it occurs on the node 
and where it appears in P,,. 
Note that here only property-of links are allowed to be fuzzy. Extensions permit- 
ting fuzzy subset-of links and/or fuzzy element-of links may be considered in future 
works. It is a consequence of this definition that any multiple-inheritance hierarchy v 
constructed in this manner will have exactly one individual node for each individual 
constant appearing in the path, and exactly one kind node for each kind-type predi- 
cate symbol appearing the path, but may have any number of property nodes for each 
property-type predicate symbol appearing in the path. Each property node is linked to a 
unique individual or kind node. 
The provisions in item (2) ensure that the associated specificity ranks are well- 
defined. It is a consequence of the above that an individual or kind node can appear in 
more than one path (and thus have more than one rank) only if those paths originate at 
different roots. This it will turn out is the only situation in which multiple inheritance 
can occur. 
The integer indices on property nodes and property-type predicate symbols are used 
to keep track of which occurrences of the symbol in the path correlate with which 
occurrences of it in the hierarchy. In the following it is to be understood that the 
index attached to a particular predicate symbol will be “carried with” it through any 
succeeding applications of Modus Ponens or the Substitution Rule. More exactly, if 
Q is inferred from P and P G Q by Modus Ponens, and if the Q in the premise 
P i Q contains an occurrence of a property-type predicate symbol with index k, then 
the corresponding occurrence of that symbol in the conclusion Q also has index k. 
Similarly, if P(a/x) is inferred from P by the Substitution Rule, and if the P in the 
premise contains an occurrence of a property-type predicate symbol with index k, then 
the corresponding occurrence of that symbol in the conclusion P (a/x) also has index 
k. The stages in the evolution of a DRS may conveniently be described as four-tuples 
(Li,~i,4i,~i). 
Given the foregoing definitions, one can define a Specijcity Rule by: 
(LP, A) 
(Cj-P, A’) 
(48 A”), if p > p’ 
(L,j-RA”), if p’ > p 
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CanPly 
Bird 
~1 
IS-l2 
Penguin 
Is-a 
Is-a 
t 
Not 
Tweety opus 
Fig. 1. Tweety can fly, but can Opus’? 
where P is of either the form &)(x) or fy (“)(a), and assuming that k is the index of 
the occurrence of &‘) in the first premise and that k’ is the index of its occurrence in 
the second 
P 
remise, p is one of the (possibly many) specificity ranks for the property 
node for czkv) in the current V, p’ is one of the (possibly many) specificity ranks for 
the property node for CY~, (‘) in the current V, p and p’ are comparable by <, and where, 
as in prior rules, the index in h ” is larger than the indices in A and A’. In addition, 
when applying this rule, the status of whichever premise does not wind up becoming 
the conclusion is changed to ofi In effect the rule says that the property associated with 
the most specific node must always take priority over the less specific. 
The remainder of this section is concerned with illustrating the various features of 
these definitions through a series of examples. We shall begin with the aforementioned 
situations regarding Tweety and Opus. This particular problem (or pair of problems) 
is customarily represented along the lines of Fig. 1 (adapted from Touretzky’s [ 1751). 
Here Tweety clearly can fly, but it is not determined whether Opus can fly or not. On 
the latter point the diagram is either contradictory or ambiguous, depending on how one 
interprets it, and neither of these results seem completely satisfactory. Thus the brunt of 
most treatments of inheritance-based default reasoning has been to devise interpretations 
of this and similar such diagrams which will lead to intuitively correct results. 
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Is-a 
lAveety opus 
Fig. 2. Tweety likely can fly, and Opus certainly cannot. 
One possible corresponding diagram resulting from the use of a DRS is shown in 
Fig. 2. This can be generated as follows. Let (LO, GTO, 40, ~0) be as in the foregoing 
definitions, i.e., LO is the language with no individual constants or predicate symbols and 
r. = 40 = ~0 = 0 (empty set), let L1 and all succeeding languages be the one obtained 
from LO by adjoining the individual constants Tweety and Opus and the predicate 
symbols Birdck), Penguinck), and CanFly( and let 41 and all succeeding inference 
rule sets consist of the versions of Modus Ponens (abbreviated MP) and the Substitution 
Rule (Sub) described in Section 4, together with the Specificity Rule (Spec) described 
above. Now let path ~1 be obtained from ~0 by inputting the labeled formula 
L3Birdck) (Tweety ) (I,{rec},0,on> 
Then in accordance with item ( 1) in the definition of DRS, VI is formed from ~0 by 
adding nodes for Tweety and Birdck), together with an element-of link connecting them 
(labeled “is-a” in Fig. 2). Next form 71-2 from ~1 by inputting 
Q3(Penguinck)(x) + Birdck)(x)) (2, {ret}, 0, on> 
which requires that we form ~2 from VI in accordance with DRS item (2). Here, since 
a node already exists for Birdck), one need only add one for Penguinck), together with 
the appropriate subset-of link. Next let us form 7r3 by inputting 
C3Penguin Ck) (Opus) (3, {rec},0,on) 
and form ~3 from 29 by applying DRS item ( 1). Here we already have a node for 
Penguinck), so we need only add one for Opus, together with with the appropriate 
element-of link. Next form GT~ by inputting 
&I (Birdck)(X) --+ CanFly( (4, {ret}, 0, on) 
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and apply DRS item (3) to form ~4 from ~0. Since the occurrence of CanFly does 
not bear an index, we must here add a node for CanFly@), together with the appropriate 
property-of link. Moreover, since this is the first occurrence of CanFly in the hierarchy, 
we must label this symbol with the index 1, both where it appears in ~4 and where it 
appears in 7r4, making the above labeled fo~ula now read as 
Qt (Bird(@(x) + CanFly:“)( 
Last, form 7rs by inputting 
(4, {I-e+, 0, on) 
&s (Penguin(k) (x) --+ -1CanFly@) (x) > (5, {W}, 0,an) 
and applying DRS item (4). Again the occurrence of CanFly@) does not bear an index, 
so we must add a node for CanFly (“I, together with the appropriate property-of link. 
Since this is the second occurrence of CanFly in the hierarchy, we here label this 
symbol with the index 2, both in vs and n-5, making the above read as 
G& ( Penguinck) (x) + XanFly:“’ (x) ) (5, {ret}, 0,an) 
This completes the formation of the hierarchy depicted in Fig. 2. At this point, the speci- 
ficity ranks of the nodes are: Bird ikf has rank ( I), Tweety has rank ( 1, I), Penguin(k) 
has rank ( 1,2), Opus has rank ( I, 2, l), CanFly~‘~ inherits the rank (1) from Birdtk), 
and CanFly, (iJi inherits the rank ( 1,2) from Penguin fkf Note that the order with which . 
the above formulas are introduced is immaterial to the structure of the hierarchy, except 
that if formula (5) (i.e., the one with index 5) had preceded formula (4), then the 
subscripts on the two occurrences of CanFly would be reversed. 
To see how the hierarchy in Fig. 2 may be used for syllogistic and default reasoning, 
let us continue developing the above DRS as follows. The intention is to conduct all 
reasoning so as to preserve semantic validity with respect to the implicit interpreta- 
tion (in effect, the hierarchy ~5 itself). In some places where a deduction follows by 
standard techniques from classical propositional calculus, the necessary steps will here 
be condensed into a single step and justified as such (abbreviated PC). Recall from 
Section 2.4 that all formulas of the form 
QjfP + Q) “t(G?,P-r;ciQ) (*) 
are valid under every inte~retation, To illustrate how one does simple syllogistic rea- 
soning in a DRS, let us first consider the situation of Tweety. One begins by inputting 
the appropriate instance of (*), namely 
Qt (Bird(k)(x) -+ CanFly, ““(x)) ;i(LsBird(“)(x) GLtCanFlyiP)(x)) 
(6, {=c},0,on) 
Then from formulas (4) and (6), by propositional calculus, one has 
CRBird(“)( x) 4 fZCCanFly~“i (x) (7,{PC,4,6),0,ofi) 
At this step, in accordance with the definition of path logic (Section 4), the to-lists in 
the labels for formulas (4) and (6) must be changed from 0 to (7). Next apply the 
Substitution Rule to (7)) yielding 
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CsBirdck)(Tweety) -r;LtCanFlyi”)(Tweety) (8, {Sub, 7}, 0, on) 
and here change the to-list for (7) to (8). Then Modus Ponens can be applied to ( 1) 
and (8)) giving the desired result 
CtCanFlyi”)(Tweety) (9,{MP, 1,8},0,on) 
with the to-lists for (1) and (8) now reading (9). 
Simple default reasoning may be illustrated in the situation with Opus. Again using 
(*), input 
Qs(Penquin(k)(X) -+ Birdck) (x) ) G( LsPenguin (k)(~) 4 C,Birdck)(X)) 
( 10, {ret}, 0, on> 
Then from (2) and (lo), by propositional calculus, one has 
CsPenguin ck) (x) -li CsBirdck) (x) (ll,{PC,2,10},0,on) 
Here the to-lists in the labels for (2) and ( 10) are changed from 0 to { 11). Now apply 
propositional calculus to (7) and ( 11)) yielding 
CsPenguin ck)(_x) A,CtCanFly[“)(x) U2,{PC,7,11},0,on) 
and changing the to-lists for (7) and (11) to { 12). Next apply the Substitution Rule, 
yielding 
Cs ( Penguinck) (Opus) + Lt CanFly{“)( Opus) ) (13, {Sub, 12}, 0, on) 
with to-list for (12) changed to { 13). Then from (3) and (13), by Modus Ponens, one 
has 
CtCanFlyf”)(Opus) (14,{MP,3,13},0,on) 
with to-lists for (3) and (13) changed to (14). Now apply (*) again to get 
Qs (Penguin’k)( x) + CanFly:“)( x) ) A( CsPenguin’k)( x) % LsCanFlyp)( x) ) 
(15,{m},0,on) 
Then from (5) and (15) by propositional calculus one has 
CsPenguin(k’ (x) Ij LsXanFly$‘) (x) ) ( 16, {PC, 5,15}, 0, on) 
(with to-lists for (5) and (15) now { 16)) which, by Substitution, yields 
CsPenguin(k) (Opus) -li LsCanFlyp)( Opus) ) ( 17, {Sub, 16}, 0, on) 
(with to-list for (16) now { 17)). By Modus Ponens, (3) and (17) give 
CsCanFlyp)( Opus) (18, {MP, 3,17}, 0,on) 
(with to-list for (3) becoming { 14,18} and to-list for ( 17) becoming { 18)). Now we 
are in a position to apply the Specificity Rule to (14) and (18). Since the rank of the 
node for -CanFly?’ is > that of the node for CanFlyiP), this yields 
f+CanFly:“) (Opus) ( 19, {Spec, 14,18}, 0,~) 
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Fig. 3. Is Bosco aquatic, or not? 
with to-list for ( 14) and ( 18) becoming { 19}, and with the status indicator in the label 
for ( 14) being changed to u# Thus we arrive at the desired conclusion, and forbid any 
further use of the undesired alternative. 
Having fully detailed this first example, the work will be shortened on the remaining 
examples by considering only the manners in which they differ from preceding examples. 
Fig. 3 is a puzzle adapted from Stein’s [ 1681. This is similar to the foregoing case of 
Opus, in that it is not explicitly evident (in fact, again either contradictory or ambiguous) 
whether Bosco is aquatic. As shown in Fig. 4, this problem may resolved in essentially 
the same manner as for Opus. Here one need only take “aquatic” as a property rather 
than a kind. Then arguing upward through the kind nodes, one can conclude that BOSCO 
is a mammal. Next, after the appropriate syllogistic arguments, together with the fact 
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Fig. 4. Bosco is an aquatic mammal 
that Aquatic?) is more specific than TAquatic, (I’), the Specificity Rule gives that Bosco 
certainly is aquatic. 
Fig. 5 is the well-known Nixon Diamond (taken from [ 1771). Here the problem is 
that Nixon inherits two conflicting properties, and the diagram does not say how this 
conflict should be resolved. One way in which this might be handled in a DRS is shown 
in Fig. 6. There “quaker” and “republican” are taken as kinds, “pacifist” is taken as a 
property, and for the sake of the illustration, the property-of links are qualified with the 
fuzzy quantifier most. As was pointed out in Section 1.2, the choice of whether a given 
predicate should be interpreted as representing a property versus a kind is oftentimes 
arbitrary, and this is surely the case here. As will be seen, however, the present choice 
has the advantage of leading to the intuitively desirable result. 
Let us reason informally. Suppose that after the first four steps, the path is 
Nixon is a quaker. 
Most quakers are pacificistst . 
Nixon is a republican. 
Most republicans are not pacificists;?. 
(l,{wc},0,on) 
(2, {m}, 0, on) 
(3, {rec},0,on) 
(4, {ret}, 0,on) 
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Pacifist 
Quaker Republican 
Nixon 
Fig. 5. Nkm Diamond: Is Nixon a pacifist, or not? 
Quaker (k)s Pacifist 1 (‘I Republican (k)Mosl lPacifist, (‘I 
Nixon 
Fig. 6. It is ztncertain whether Nixon is a pacifist. 
This creates the figure as shown. Then from ( 1) and (2)) one may argue syllogistically 
(here condensing several steps into one) to conclude 
Nixon likely is a pacifist,. (5, {Syh, 1,2}, 0, on> 
and from (3) and (4)) one may argue syllogistically to conclude 
Nixon is likely not a pacifist;?. 6{Sy%3,4),0,on~ 
Now recall from Section 2.4, that all formulas of the form 
are valid. Taking i = -2, this gives 
Nixon is unlikely to be a pacifist2 iff Nixon is likely not a pacifist;!. 
(7, {ret}, 0,on> 
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Then from (6) and (7) one can derive 
Nixon is unlikely to be a pacifistz. (8, {PC, 6,7}, 0, on) 
Let the rule set for our DRS now be expanded to include the modifier combination rules 
described by Table 2 (Section 4). Then by the rule corresponding to row 2, column -2, 
from (5) and (8) one obtains 
It is uncertain whether Nixon is a pacifisto. (9, {Tb12(2, -2)) 5,8}, 0, on) 
At this step, the status indicators for (5) and (8) must be changed to 08 Note that here 
the index of the predicate “pacifist” has been given as 0. This action would naturally 
be a part of the general definition of the modifier combination rules, inasmuch as, after 
using such a rule, the index becomes irrelevant. The use of 0 as a “dummy index” 
prevents the introduction of this formula into the path from leading also to the entry 
of new nodes and/or links into the associated inheritance hierarchy (i.e., as would be 
prescribed by the definition of DRS). 
This conclusion regarding Nixon corresponds to the “skeptical” inheritances of Horty, 
Thomason, and Touretzky [ 791, and clearly conforms with ordinary common sense. A 
variation, perhaps more in keeping with Fig. 5, would have both occurrences of the 
modifier Most in Fig. 6 replaced by All. Then arguments such as the above would yield, 
on the one hand, that Nixon certainly is a pacifist, and on the other that he is certainly 
not a pacifist, from which modifier combination (row 3, column -3) would yield the 
contradiction 
I (9,{Tbl2(3,-3),5,8},@,on) 
again with status of (5) and (8) changed to 08 This would naturally lead next to 
application of some form of reason maintenance along the lines described in Section 4. 
The simplest approach would be to just turn the status of (9) to 08, thereby disallowing 
its use in any future derivations. Another would be to backtrack through the from-lists 
to weed out one or more earlier “culprit” formulas, turn their status indicators 08, and 
then forward chain through to-lists making further status modifications as appropriate to 
all conclusions based on those culprits. Here one might want, for example, to disable 
the formula which says that all quakers are pacifists (and also the above contradiction 
i), leaving only the possibility that Nixon is (certainly) not a pacifist inasmuch as he 
is a republican. A third approach would be to go back through the from-lists and alter 
the quantifiers, e.g., change one or more occurrences of all to most, and then forward 
chain through to-lists to make appropriate modifier changes. The effect here would be to 
disable the above contradictory conclusion i and introduce a qualified statement about 
Nixon’s pacifism. The details of how and when to apply these various techniques have 
yet to be worked out. 
Note that the Specificity Rule would not be applicable in the Nixon example, since 
the rankings of Pacifist, and Pacifist2 in Fig. 6 are not comparable by <. To wit, if 
Quaker and Republican are assigned ranks ( 1) and (2), respectively, then these are 
inherited by Pacifist1 and Pacifistz, respectively, and neither is > than the other; and it 
would make no difference if Republican were ranked ( 1) and Quaker with (2). Note 
also that Nixon has two ranks, (1, 1) and (2, l), corresponding to the two possible 
inheritance paths. 
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Fig. 7. Is Suzie a mammal, hence a milk producer? Does she lay eggs? 
Fig. 7 is also adapted from Stein’s [ 1681. Here it is indeterminate whether Susie is 
a mammal, and hence also whether she is a milk-producer. One of the several possible 
ways this might be dealt with in a DRS is shown in Fig. 8. The various decisions as to 
what should be properties versus kinds seem at least reasonable. Given this hierarchy, 
the techniques of the foregoing examples can be applied to infer that Suzie is certainly a 
mammal, that she certainly produces milk, and she certainly lays eggs. It is of interest, 
that even though Fig. 7 bears a structure similar to Fig. 5, the corresponding solution 
via predicate typing leads to two very different kinds of inheritance hierarchies, one 
involving multiple inheritance, and one not. 
Another problem arising in the literature is depicted in Fig. 9 (from [ 1771) Here one 
has a contradiction arising from the “redundancy” in there being two alternative paths 
from Clyde to Elephant. A simple solution using the current methods is Fig. 10, yielding 
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Fig. 8. Susie is a mammal that produces milk and lays eggs 
the conclusion that Clyde is likely not gray. The significant feature here is the manner 
in which the definition of DRS implicitly prevents the redundancy. If after inputting the 
formulas needed to create this hierarchy, one next introduces a formula saying 
Clyde is an Elephant. 
DRS item (2b) requires that the corresponding (redundant) link be removed immedi- 
ately after adding it. Alternatively, if this formula were input prior to, say, 
Royal elephants are elephants. 
then DRS item (2b) would allow the link to be added, but when the link corresponding 
to the latter is added, creating a 2-step path from Clyde to Elephant, then the same item 
would now require that the l-step link from Clyde to Elephant, corresponding to the 
former formula, be removed. Thus, in any case, one winds up with the same hierarchy 
as shown in Fig. 10. 
Last consider the somewhat more complex Expanded Nixon Diamond shown in 
Fig. 11 (also from [ 1771). In this case it is indeterminate both whether Nixon is a 
pacifist and whether he is anti-military. A possible rendition of this in a DRS is Fig. 12. 
Here the significant feature is that certain predicates are taken as representing both 
properties and kinds, namely, “pacifist” and “football fan”. After inputting the formulas 
needed to create this (disconnected) hierarchy, one would then also want to input the 
formulas 
QsPacifist’k’ (x) G &Pacifist@) (x) 
&sFootballFan(k) (x) tr; QFootballFan(“) (x) 
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Fig. 9. Is Clyde gray, or not? 
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Fig. 10. Clyde is likely not gray 
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Fig. 11. Expanded Nixon Diamond: Is Nixon anti-military, or not? 
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Fig. 12. It is uncertain whether Nixon is anti-military. 
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establishing the necessary formal connections between the predicate symbols of the two 
types. Then reasoning along the lines of the foregoing Nixon Diamond example will 
lead to the propositions that Nixon, on the one hand, is likely to be anti-military, and 
on the other hand, is unlikely to be anti-military, which through modifier combination 
yields that it is uncertain whether Nixon is anti-military or not. This again seems to 
comply with ordinary common sense. 
Note that instead of the above two formulas it might have been preferable to input 
something along the lines of, e.g., 
Qj (Pacifist(k) (x) +G Pacifist”” (x) ) 
in order to more exactly capture the intention that Pacifistck) and Pacifist@) denote the 
same underlying predicate, but such formulas are not expressible in the present language. 
One possible remedy for this would be to introduce a binary ~b at the lower linguistic 
level, defined semantically by 
ifeitherZ(P) =Z(Q) = 1 or I(P) =I(Q) =O, 
Then in accordance with the definitions in Section 4, one would have the second-level 
formula 
&j (Pacifist’@ (x) +-+h Pacifist’“’ (x) ) 
which does capture the intended interrelation. It is noteworthy also that a full set of 
binary (classical) connectives could be introduced at the lower level using similar 
techniques. 
6. The notion of “unless” 
The matter of formulating the everyday notion of “unless” dates back to Sandewall’s 
[ 1531 and has appeared in various guises throughout the literature (see Section 7.5). 
The problem is to devise a system that allows for propositions such as 
Bird(x) z CanFly( x) Unless Penguin(x) 
or possibly 
Bird(x) liCanFly(x) Unless x = Opus 
which state that individuals having certain properties, or possibly certain specific in- 
dividuals, are exceptions to the “rule” that birds can fly. The intention is that such 
propositions be used in syllogisms of the form, for open P, Q, R, 
P li Q Unless R 
P(a/x) 
qR(a/x) 
Q(a/x) 
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where R is a disjunction of any number of possible exceptions having either the form 
a~([‘) (x) or x = a. 
It happens that this style of reasoning is already implicit in the methods of inheritance 
hierarchies described in Section 5. In effect, exceptions are nodes that block defaults 
based on specificity, as in the example of Opus. In order to fully portray the above 
notion of “unless”, however, the exceptions need to be explicitly stated along with the 
relevant inferences. Note that these same considerations arise in the context of the fuzzy 
modifiers. For example, one might want a rule along the lines of 
Most birds can fly. 
Tweety is a bird. 
Tweety is not exceptional. 
It is likely that Tweety can fly. 
Here it will be outlined how such rules might be formulated within a DRS by 
extending that framework in an appropriate way. Let formula labels include as a sixth 
item an exception list, denoted ex, which may contain any number of property-type 
predicate symbols and any number of individual constants. Introduce as a new inference 
rule: for open P, Q, 
(&,(P’Q,>A) 
(P(a/x), A’) 
n is not exceptional as per exA 
where the third premise is validated by (i) verifying that for no individual constant 
a’ E exA is a = cl’, and (ii) searching backwards through the path and verifying, for 
each ~6”) E exn, that no formula of the form (Y (P)(u) has formerly been derived. In 
effect, one here adopts a procedural semantics for logical inference. 
This clearly has the desired effect. It remains only to establish a procedure for making 
entries into the exception list. A simple approach would be to have exceptions be already 
present in the list for any formula that is received by the DRS from outside the system. 
For example, the human user could provide some such exceptions in advance. In addition 
to this, however, one would also want exceptions to be entered into the list whenever they 
are “discovered” as a result of reasoning with the semantic network. This would require 
higher-level mechanisms that “observe” the ongoing reasoning process and “notice” 
when an exceptional situation has appeared. Exactly how to do this is another item 
reserved for future works. 
7. Other varieties of nonmonotonicity 
While the notion of a DRS was devised initially to formulate default reasoning 
with fuzzy modifiers, it can be used also to portray other types of reasoning. This 
section outlines how one may formulate versions of the earlier varieties of nonmonotonic 
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reasoning (Section 1) within this frame. This makes explicit the temporal aspects that 
were only implicit in the earlier formalisms. 
7.1. Circumscription 
McCarthy’s “predicate” circumscription [ 1001 and “formula” circumscription [ 1011 
were described in Section 1 .l. These ideas soon attracted a following, and further 
versions were proposed. Minker and Perlis [ 11 l] developed a method of “protected” 
circumscription, Lifschitz [ 961 introduced “pointwise” circumscription, Perlis [ 1353 
considered circumscribing “with sets”, and in [ 1361 introduced the idea of “autocir- 
cumscription”. Some general problems of self-reference arising in systems which al- 
low circumscriptive axioms were discussed by Perlis [ 1341, and a solution to these 
and related difficulties subsequently appeared as [41,42]. Other relevant works are 
[95,97,98, 1391. A concise summary may be found in [ 1371 and a recent history 
in [ 1031. 
This section considers only predicate circumscription. It has yet to be determined if 
the others can be handled in a similar way. Let cy be an n-ary predicate symbol, and let 
P( cu) be a first-order formula containing the elementary formula n(x), where X stands 
for the sequence x1,. . . , x,, of individual variables. Let d! be an n-ary predicate variable, 
and let P (&/a) be the expression obtained from P(U) by replacing all occurrences of cy 
with occurrences of iu. Then, considered as a rule of inference, Predicate Circumscription 
may be expressed as 
P(ff) 
P(&/a) r\V’x(&(a) --f P) + V’x(P 4 k(X)) 
McCarthy described this as a nonmonotonic “rule of conjecture”. It has the effect of 
saying that, if a’, . . . ,zi”’ are all the nary sequences of individual constants from the 
language of a first-order theory T for which the formulas P( a’/_?) (i = 1, . . . , m) are 
known to be true, then after applying the rule, these will be the only nary sequences 
about which P can possibly be true. Knowing that a formula P is true is expressed 
formally by its being derivable in T. The rule is validated by restricting the semantics 
for T to a collection of minimal models. At the semantic level, circumscription says that 
the orzly models in which P(a) is valid are the smallest ones in which it must be valid. 
This style of reasoning harbors a temporal element in that, if after applying the above 
rule, one discovers new individuals about which P( cu) is true, then the foregoing rule 
application becomes invalid, and can only be revalidated by expanding the minimal 
models to include the new individuals. Nonmonotonicity arises in that some conclusions 
derived from the earlier rule application may no longer be valid in the newer models. 
Such earlier conclusions are thus retracted simply by virtue of the fact that the newer 
models render them invalid. 
This type of reasoning can be described in a DRS framework as follows. “Discov- 
ering” new individuals would be represented by the system’s “receiving” some new 
propositions of the form P(a) (a/.?). In this step, the language would be expanded to 
include the new individual constants. Then in this context, the rule of circumscription 
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would be reapplied, yielding a “conjecture ” identical to the above, except with a label 
indicating a later time step. By having a different label, this formula can be provided 
with a different set of models, and retraction of the earlier conjecture would be accom- 
plished by switching its status indicator to ofi Then to-lists would need to be traced in 
order to also retract any conclusions that may have been based on the conjecture thus 
retracted. 
7.2. Default logic 
The formulation of default logic due to Reiter [ 1501 has inspired several alternative 
versions that similarly employ the more conventional style of formalism, i.e., that do 
not use inheritance hierarchies. These include Fisher [50], Pollock [ 142-1441, Poole 
[ 145,146], Nute [128-1311, Li and You [94], Simari and Loui [ 1611, Thirunarayan 
and Kifer [ 1721. 
Despite the intuitive appeal of Reiter’s version, it has the well-known drawback that 
in all but the very simplest cases, it is either impossible, or very difficult, to implement. 
This is due to its use of the operator M, meaning “is consistent”. In a system offering 
the semantic richness of first-order logic, for example, M is impossible to implement 
because, in that context, whether an arbitrarily selected set of formulas is consistent is 
formally undecidable. And in simpler systems, like propositional calculus, even though 
consistency is decidable, it is normally computationally intractable. 
An inference rule similar in spirit with Reiter’s default could nonetheless be imple- 
mented in a DRS, if one were to replace the operator M with one representing a kind 
of “local consistency”. Let (L, r, 4) be a path-logic triple in a DRS; let the length of 
r be its number of formula occurrences; and let an extension of v be any path which 
includes r as an initial segment, which is comprised exclusively of formulas in L, and 
which employs applications only of rules in 4. Suppose the length of r is m. Then say 
that a formula Q is n-ply consistent with r if, for no extension 7r’ of r having length 
II + 112, do we have either (i) Q E $‘, or (ii) Q(a/x) E $‘, for any individual constant 
n of L. Let M,Q represent “Q is n-ply consistent with the current path”. Then the 
desired rule may be written 
P’;Q 
P 
M,,Q 
Q 
Such would best be used in conjunction with a suitable reason maintenance system. 
Then, if after drawing a conclusion Q based on it’s n-ply consistency, it is later dis- 
covered that Q is in fact inconsistent, there would be a way for it to be retracted. 
This type of reasoning would be useful for robot motion planning. The robot could 
be programmed to look ahead some number of steps in order to determine whether a 
particular action may reasonably be expected to lead to the desired goal, and if nothing 
to the contrary is detected, it would be allowed to go ahead and make the considered 
step. 
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7.3. Nonmonotonic logic 
The system of nonmonotonic logic introduced by McDermott and Doyle [ 1071 was 
problematic in that it did not provide a completely specified semantics. McDermott 
[ 1051 attempted to fill this void, but with limited success. A modification which effec- 
tively solved this problem was the “autoepistemic logic” developed by Moore [ 114,115]. 
The collection [ 1221 adds further results along this line, and recent progress is reviewed 
in [116]. 
Section 1 noted that the original system is characterized by having propositions of 
the form 
PAMQ’;Q 
where again M is interpreted as “is consistent” but is now taken more exactly as a 
reinterpretation of the classical modality “is possible”. This suggests that a semblance 
of nonmonotonic logic may be formulated within the type of extension of Q described in 
Section 3. Here one simply takes the above M as another notation for the probabilistic 
0. The extent to which this gives the desirable features of the later systems has yet to 
be explored. 
7.4. Truth maintenance 
The subject of truth (or reason) maintenance has been mentioned several times 
throughout this paper, and it has been explained how a simple variety of this could be 
employed in a DRS. Doyle’s truth maintenance system [25] is unique among the early 
proposals in that it explicitly addressed the temporal aspect of natural human reasoning. 
That system employed a somewhat richer and more complex style of reasoning than has 
been considered here, however. There each formula is associated with both an in list 
and an out list. At any given point in time, a formula is “in” (believed) if (i) all the 
formulas in its in-list are “in”, and (ii) all the formulas in its out list are “out” (not 
believed). 
Nonetheless, this richer logical structure can be formulated via an expanded notion 
of DRS. The in-list and out-list for a formula can be given as additional items in the 
label. Then let a formula be “in” it all the members of it in-list are present in the path 
with status indicators “on”, and let it be “out” if some member of its out-list either is 
not currently in the path or is present in the path with status “off”. Note that, in the 
context of a full-fledged DRS, if one allows for formulas to be retracted, then one must 
also provide for removal of any corresponding items in the associated semantic net. 
7.5. “Unless” revisited 
Each of circumscription, default logic, and nonmonotonic logic embody aspects of 
“unless”. McCarthy [ 100, 1011 explained how circumscription may be used in conjunc- 
tion with a predicate ab expressing “abnormality”. For example, 
Bird(x) A ?ab(x) + CanFly 
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says that if x is a bird, and x is not abnormal, then x can fly, Suppose there are 
two individuals, Tweety and Opus, asserted to be birds, and suppose we additionally 
have ab(Opus). Then predicate circumscription with respect to ab yields a formula 
which says that the only bird that can fly is Tweety. Thus, in so many words, the 
above inference says that a bird can fly u~zless it is explicitly known to be abnor- 
mal. 
In default logic, the modal operator M embodies the notion of unless in the sense 
of expressing unless inconsistent, where inconsistent means leading to a contradiction. 
Thus as was seen, if it is known that Opus cannot fly, then it would be inconsistent to 
assume that he can, in which case the default would not be applied. In so many words, 
this says that it is permitted to infer that Opus can fly unless it is explicitly known 
that he can’t. The M in nonmonotonic logic may be interpreted similarly, but where 
“inconsistent” is synonymous with “impossible”. 
The formulation of unless given in Section 6 bears many similarities with these, and 
may be thus construed as a further, roughly equivalent, alternative. Its advantage is that 
it leads to a much more straightforward implementation. 
8. The frame problem 
As mentioned in Section 1 .l, the frame problem was defined by McCarthy and Hayes 
[ 1041 in the context of an elaboration of McCarthy’s situation calculus [ 991. The aim 
of this calculus was to formalize the sense in which an intelligent agent (human or 
digital) may keep track of, reason about, and possibly affect the changes taking place in 
its surrounding environment. Informally a situation is a description of the state of affairs 
that obtain at a particular point in time, and successive changes in the environment are 
represented as transitions from one situation to the next. The word frume is taken more 
or less synonymously with “situation”, but carries the added connotation of being a 
frame of reference. It may also be regarded analogously with a frame in a movie film. 
Formally a frame consists of a collection of properties, called Juents, which tend to 
persist in time but are subject to change. To illustrate, suppose situation s has a blue 
block sitting on the left side of a table, and situation s’ is obtained by moving the 
block to the right. Consider the fluents “color” and “position”. One would say that in 
the transition from situation s to situation s’, the position fluent has changed, while the 
color fluent (barring any unknown intermediary actions, such as painting the block red) 
has remained unchanged. A concise restatement of the problem appears in Hayes’ [ 73, 
p. 1251 as follows: 
One feels that there should be some economical and principled way of succinctly 
saying what changes an action makes, without having to explicitly list all the 
things it doesn’t change as well; yet there doesn’t seem to be any other way to 
do it. That is the frame problem. 
This has subsequently come to be recognized as one of the key problems in the 
field of AI. Both McCarthy and Hayes have returned to the topic, the former in [ 1021 
and the latter in [69,73,74]. Moreover, Hayes [70,72] has tied it to a new realm of 
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applications known as “naive physics”. The problem has become the subject of several 
workshops [ 19,5 1,52,148], and a recent survey of the main issues and contributors has 
appeared in the review [ 1741 of [52]. 
An outgrowth of these studies has been the identification of a number of related prob- 
lems and subproblems. In particular, the qualification problem [ 100, 101 ] is exemplified 
by the parenthetical statement in the above example, to wit, that it is generally impos- 
sible to list all the exceptions which might invalidate a certain inference (or prevent a 
certain action). Others are the rumijcation problem, that it is generally impossible to 
specify all the potential consequences of a given inference (or action), and the persis- 
tence problem, that of how to represent which fluents endure, and which do not endure, 
as the system moves from each situation to the next. 
Proper analysis of these problems requires first of all that a clear distinction be 
made between the changes of state effected by the internal processes of the reasoning 
agent and the changes of situation that occur in the agent’s external environment. 
This internal-external distinction has been explored to some depth in the literature on 
“situation theory” [ 15,241. From this vantage it is clear that none of the above problems 
arise in the context of multiple-inheritance reasoning as it is described in the foregoing 
sections. This is because one is in these cases always reasoning about an essentially 
static universe. Even though both the path and inheritance hierarchy can grow over time, 
the underlying domain of discourse remains static. In other words, we have here been 
modeling the evolution of an agent’s knowledge about an unchanging universe. 
There is nothing inherent in the notion of DRS, however, which requires that this 
always be the case. Indeed propositions being added to the path can be instructions for 
the DRS to perform certain actions (e.g., turn right, send a message to agent X), or 
they can be internal representations of information received concerning changes in the 
external environment (e.g., sensor data). 
In the case of a human agent interacting with the real world, it would be natural to 
assume that both state and situation transitions occur along a time continuum. When 
developing a representational formalism suitable for implementation in a digital agent, 
however, it is more natural to assume that at least the internal state changes occur in 
discrete time steps. The length of a step might be the time required to perform one 
logical inference, or to perform some other kind of primitive action. In making this 
assumption one thereby implicitly agrees that the agent must forsake a certain variety 
of omniscience, inasmuch as an all-knowing agent would be one whose internal states 
exactly mirror the external situations. 
In addition one must also forsake the kind of omniscience which claims a complete 
understanding of all past and potential future events (see Section 1). This of course is 
justified, inasmuch as humans themselves do not have such perfect awareness. Hence 
it would be unreasonable to expect this of any digital agents. McDermott [ 1061 in 
particular has argued along these lines to suggest that the frame problem itself may 
not actually need to be completely resolved; and indeed this view may be seen to 
underly virtually all studies in nonmonotonic reasoning, inasmuch as they aim to create 
agents which reason and make successful decisions in spite of having only incomplete 
information about the external world. From this standpoint, a perfect resolution of the 
frame problem may be viewed as a cognitive ideal, i.e., something to be strived toward 
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in an effort to create ever more sophisticated digital agents, but not something one would 
expect to ever fully achieve. 
Here it will be outlined how these various problems might be construed within the 
context of a DRS. In order to do so, it will be necessary to decide what should be meant 
by a transition in the agent’s internal state. It would be natural to allow that a state 
transition involve changes in any number of (propositions representing) fluents. For 
purposes of portraying this within the framework of a DRS, however, it will be simpler 
to agree that a state transition involves only one such change. Then a state may be given 
as an initial segment of a path, and a state transition will entail a single reasoning step, 
either (i) moving from a path of some length n to one of length n + 1, or (ii) going 
back into the path and changing some proposition’s status indicator from “on” to “off”, 
or possibly (iii) one action of each of these types made in immediate succession (see 
below). Note that there is no loss of generality in this, since multiple changes can be 
easily represented as a sequence of individual changes. 
Given these assumptions, the persistence problem amounts to that of representing each 
relevant fluent by a proposition in the path. In the blocks world example given above, 
state II might consist of the propositions: 
The block is on the left. (with status “on”) 
The block is blue. (status “on”) 
in which case state n + 1 would consist of 
The block is on the left. (with status now “off”) 
The block is blue. (status “on”) 
The block is on the right. (status “on”) 
In this manner, the fact that the position fluent has changed is represented by the addition 
of a new proposition, together with a change in the status for an earlier proposition, and 
the fact that the color fluent has endured is represented by the fact that the status of 
the second proposition in the path has remained unchanged. This procedure is similar 
to the one employed by the STRIPS planning system [ 491. The persistence problem is 
solvable in this context to the extent that it is possible to list all the fluents pertinent to 
the given situation. To the extent that some fluents may be left out, this constitutes a 
further impingement on the agent’s omniscience. 
The qualification problem harkens the discussion in Section 6. In that context, this 
amounts to the problem of including all relevant exceptions in a proposition’s exception 
list. Here omniscience might be compromised because certain exceptions are omitted or 
overlooked. 
The ramification problem amounts to that of exploring all possible extensions of a 
given path. Since paths are potentially infinite, and are also potentially infinite in number, 
solving this problem is not generally possible. One is able to explore out only as far as 
some finite number of possible future steps. Thus omniscience is limited here insofar as 
this is taken to include prescience. 
Last let us consider the frame problem itself. Inasmuch as the persistence problem has 
to do with how an agent may keep track of what changes and what remains the same 
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as the agent’s attention moves from one situation to the next, it is an important part of 
the frame problem. In addition to this, however, the latter has also to do with how the 
agent may know what may change, and what may continue to persist, as a result of a 
particular action. In effect, the critical aspect of the frame problem is that it has to do 
with endowing the agent with an ability to predict what will occur in the future, rather 
than to merely keep track of what has occurred in the past. 
The earliest, and most straightforward, way of dealing with this is to introduce what 
are known as frame axioms. For example, one might add a proposition asserting that 
merely moving a block will not change its color. In order to assert such principles in a 
DRS, however, it would be more appropriate to use frame rules. This in fact was the 
original method proposed by Hayes [ 691. Here one could add 
(Blue(Block-1), A) 
(Blue( Block- I ), A’) 
Then if at a later time it is learned that Block-l has been painted red, a reason mainte- 
nance operation could be invoked to resolve the contradiction. This of course does not 
“solve” the frame problem, but merely shows how it may be expressed within the DRS 
framework. The crux of the problem is that it is typically impossible to list all the frame 
rules that may be relevant to a given domain. 
9. Concluding remarks 
This paper has introduced the notion of a dynamic reasoning system (DRS) and 
explained how this may be used to formulate various forms of nonmonotonic reasoning. 
A secondary theme has been to introduce the logic Q of quali$ed syllogisms and to show 
how this may be employed in a new type of default reasoning. The use of a qualified 
syllogism to conclude that a default is likely true is equally as natural as the style of 
reasoning in which one simply assumes that a default holds as long as no countervailing 
information is explicitly known. A virtue of the DRS formalism is that it allows for 
both types of reasoning to be represented within the same frame. 
In process this work has left open numerous items for further investigation. Several 
have been mentioned at various places throughout the preceding sections. A further 
manner in which the notion of a DRS might be expanded would be to include not just 
one type of language, but a variety of different types of languages, each of which is 
equipped with its own set of inference rules. One would expect in this case that some 
of the languages would be interrelated, and that there would be axioms and inference 
rules expressing these interrelations. For example, one language might be of the ordinary 
first-order variety, another might be second-order, and a third might be a temporal logic. 
In addition, as shown by the literature on conceptual graphs (e.g., Sowa’s [ 165,166] ) , 
there are numerous reasons to consider semantic networks having features beyond those 
provided by a simple multiple-inheritance hierarchy. 
The DRS is a simple, yet general, framework which can serve as the basis for much 
more sophisticated reasoning systems. In particular, for creating more “intelligent” or 
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“autonomous” agents, one will need a layer of higher-level controls capable of guiding 
the agent toward specific goals. Such would entail an algorithm for deciding which 
inference rules to apply when, exactly how reason maintenance should be carried out, 
the conditions under which new symbols need to be added to the languages, etc. This 
might be accomplished in part through such methods as described by Shoham [ 1591, 
namely, implementing a logic of beliefs, obligations, and abilities. But to this one may 
also wish to add a capacity for reasoning with expectations, intentions, and desires (see 
[26] for a start in this direction). In principle, just as with human agents, our digital 
agents should be able to choose between several different reasoning strategies as the 
situation demands. 
Another issue here left open is how to prescribe rules for agent interaction, again 
for purposes of achieving goals. The notion of an “agent society” has been advanced 
by Shoham and Tennenholtz [ 1601, and the notion of a DRS could serve well for 
formulating this idea. Each agent in the society would be given as a distinct DRS. This 
provides for both the receiving and sending of messages, reasoning about the messages 
thus received, and performing various other types of actions. 
The ultimate objective of AI has traditionally been to create agents with ever more 
human-like types of minds, where by “mind” is here meant a memory together with a 
reasoning mechanism. Whether we should actually want our digital agents to be human- 
like, however, has recently become a subject for debate [ 751. Perhaps a more realistic 
aim would be to first identify among humans those mental activities that it would be 
desirable to replicate, and then seek to make only these manifest in our machines. 
Such would surely include reasoning and goal-seeking activities, and there conceivably 
could be use for agents that respond with emotions like desire and fear. On the other 
hand, one probably would not want to replicate the human propensity for behaving 
irrationally or making mistakes. While the present notion of DRS is, in this light, only 
a very rudimentary kind of “mind”, it does show potential for being developed in these 
directions. This of course will also require gaining a deeper understanding of mind itself. 
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